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I.  Introduction 
The two large Government Sponsored Housing Enterprises (GSEs),
1 the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), evolved over three quarters of a century from a single 
small government agency, to a large and powerful duopoly, and ultimately to insolvent 
institutions protected from bankruptcy only by the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
government. Between 2007 and Q2 2011, the two GSEs had realized losses of $247 
billion, and they required draws of $169 billion under the Treasured Preferred Stock 
Purchase Agreements to remain in operation. (See Federal Housing Finance Agency 
2011). This paper traces the transformation of the GSEs from privately held institutions 
with powerful direction and political influence to vassals reporting to an administrative 
agency in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, FHFA). 
Within the next few years, the agencies will have to be restructured. Proposals for 
reform include recapitalizing them in some form as Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs), reconstituting them as agencies of the federal government with more narrowly-
specified missions, or privatizing the organizations. There are also proposals to replace 
the GSEs with a variety of new government mortgage guarantee/insurance programs. The 
GSE reform and mortgage guarantee proposals are both nested within the larger question 
of what are the likely consequences of alternative roles for government in the U.S. 
housing and mortgage markets. This paper is intended to help in the deliberations about 
                                                 
1 A third, much smaller, Government Sponsored Housing Enterprise is the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System (FHLBS). The issues for reforming the FHLBS are similar to many of the issue raised in this paper 
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, although we have not analyzed separately the FHLBS or other non-
housing government enterprises.  
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“what to do” about these costly failures. We briefly review the history of the housing 
enterprises and their performance, including the recent housing crisis. We document the 
contributions of Freddie and Fannie to the operation of U.S. housing markets, and we 
analyze the role of the agencies in the recent housing crisis. We search for evidence on 
the importance of Freddie and Fannie in achieving other important housing goals. We 
compare U.S. policies with those adopted in other developed countries. 
This is not the first time we have provided some analysis of the reform options in 
housing finance, either individually (Jaffee, 2010b, 2011; Quigley 2006) or jointly (Jaffee 
and Quigley, 2010). However, it is our first attempt to consider all the history and all of 
the options. 
In section II below we discuss the background and origin of the GSEs and of the 
federal role in supplying housing credit. Section III provides a brief summary of 
homeownership and government policy. Section IV describes the broader objectives and 
goals of the GSE institutions and analyzes the most recent failures of the credit market 
and the secondary housing market. Section V links the current housing crisis to the 
insolvency of credit institutions. Section VI describes likely the consequences of a series 
of plans concerning the restructuring of these institutions and alternative mechanisms for 
government support of the U.S. mortgage market. It also provides a brief summary of the 
GSEs under their government conservatorship since September 2008. 
II.  Background 
With the public sale of its stock and its conversion into a government sponsored 
enterprise in 1968, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) emerged from 
obscurity as an agent in the market for home mortgage credit. The FNMA had been  
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established in 1938, based on provisions in the 1934 National Housing Act, after the 
collapse of the housing market during the Great Depression. The 1934 Act had 
established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to oversee a program of home 
mortgage insurance against default. Insurance was funded by the proceeds of a fixed-
premium charged on unpaid loan balances. These revenues were deposited in Treasury 
securities and managed as a mutual insurance fund. Significantly, default insurance was 
offered on “economically sound” self-amortizing mortgages with terms as long as twenty 
years and with loan-to-value ratios up to eighty percent. 
Diffusion of the new FHA product across the country required national 
standardization of underwriting procedures. Appraisals were required, and borrowers’ 
credit histories and financial capacities were reported and evaluated systematically. The 
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, established to manage the reserve of FHA premiums, 
was required to be actuarially sound. This was generally understood to allow very small 
redistributions from high income to low income FHA mortgagees. By its original design, 
the FHA was clearly intended to serve the vast majority of homeowners. 
In the 1934 Act, Congress had also sought to encourage private establishment of 
National Mortgage Associations that would buy and sell the new and unfamiliar insured 
mortgages of the Federal Housing Administration. By creating a secondary market for 
these assets, the Associations sought to increase the willingness of primary lenders to 
make these loans. No private associations were formed, however. When further 
liberalization of the terms under which associations could be organized was still 
unsuccessful, the Federal National Mortgage Association was chartered in 1938 by the 
Federal Housing Administrator following the request of the President of the United  
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States. Federal action was precipitated particularly by concern over the acceptability of 
new FHA ninety-percent twenty-five-year loans authorized that year. 
At first, the Association operated on a small scale, but its willingness to buy FHA 
mortgages encouraged lenders to make them. A 1948 authorization to purchase 
mortgages guaranteed by the Veterans Administration led the Association to make 
purchases, commitments, loans, and investments that soon approached the 
congressionally authorized limit of $2.5 billion. Since the maximum interest rate on VA 
mortgages was below the market rate, FNMA’s advance commitments to buy VA-
guaranteed mortgages at par assured windfall gains to private borrowers or lenders. The 
1954 Housing Act reorganized Fannie Mae as a mixed-ownership corporation with 
eligible shareholders being the federal government and lenders that sold mortgages to 
Fannie Mae. FNMA was then able to finance its operations through sale of its preferred 
stock to the U.S. Treasury, through sale of its common stock to lenders whose mortgages 
it bought, and by the sale of bonds to the public. 
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 transferred FNMA’s special 
assistance and the management and liquidation of part of its portfolio to the newly 
constituted Government National Mortgage Association. Its secondary market operations 
remained with FNMA, now owned entirely by private stockholders. Commercial banks 
were the primary beneficiaries of FNMA’s secondary market activities in FHA and VA 
mortgages -- since the banks specialized in originating the government-guaranteed 
mortgages. In contrast, the mortgages originated by Savings and Loan Associations 
(S&Ls) and Mutual Savings Banks (“Thrift Institutions”) were primarily “conventional” 
mortgages, meaning they received no government guarantee. The thrift institutions  
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lobbied for equal treatment, and were rewarded in 1970 with the establishment of the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) under the regulatory control 
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the S&L regulator. Freddie Mac stock first 
became publicly available in 1989, although shares owned by Freddie Mac’s financial 
partners had been traded on the New York Stock Exchange starting in 1984. 
III.  Homeownership and Government Policy 
According to de Tocqueville (1835), Americans have long been obsessed with 
owner-occupied housing. Richard Green (2011) sees this as a political issue, as societies 
are less disposed to make revolution when personal and real property is augmented and 
distributed among the population. Other recent work emphasizes the external benefits of 
owner-occupied housing, and a large social science literature has developed exploring the 
connection between higher levels of homeownership and the economic and social 
outcomes of households. Appendix Table A1 reports some of the findings linking 
homeownership to social outcomes. Two other papers (Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Haurin, 
Dietz and Weinberg, 2002) provide an exhaustive comparison of the economic and social 
consequences for those living in owner-occupied and rental housing. 
Most of the research supports the conclusion that homeownership has some 
positive effects upon the social outcomes for individuals and households. But the 
research does not conclude that the effect is very large. But even if the effect were large, 
nothing supports the conclusion that homeownership should be supported by the 
institution of the GSEs or their policy choices. In particular, the primary impact of 
instruments that focus on lowering the cost or expanding the availability of mortgages  
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will be larger mortgages, which makes those instruments ineffective and costly relative to 
direct subsidies for homeownership. 
This is important -- for as noted below many of the popular arguments in support 
of subsidies for the GSEs are based upon the promotion of homeownership in the 
economy. 
IV.  Policy Objectives for the GSEs 
A.  Primary Objectives 
The GSE charters are quite explicit in stating the goals and responsibilities of the 
enterprises, but they do not state homeownership goals directly. Instead, they seek to: 
1)  provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages; 
2)  respond appropriately to the private capital market; 
3)  provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages 
(including activities relating to mortgages on housing for low- and moderate-income 
families involving a reasonable economic return that may be less than the return earned 
on other activities) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the 
distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage financing; 
4)  promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation (including central cities, 
rural areas, and underserved areas) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments 
and improving the distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage 
financing; and 
5)  manage and liquidate federally owned mortgage portfolios in an orderly manner, 
with a minimum of adverse effect upon the residential mortgage market and minimum 
loss to the Federal Government.  
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This section reviews the key activities of the GSEs with respect to providing 
stability, assistance, and liquidity to the secondary market for residential mortgages. The 
specific objectives of the secondary market activities have varied over time, including 
operations to reinforce or offset fiscal and monetary policy, to increase residential 
construction, to make a market in federally underwritten mortgages, to reduce regional 
yield differentials, and to act as a mortgage lender of last resort. (See Guttentag, 1963, for 
an extensive discussion of these key activities.) 
A.1  Quantitative Impact of the GSEs on the U.S. Home Mortgage Market 
Table 1 reviews the quantitative role of the GSEs in the US mortgage market over 
the recent past. The top panel reports the outstanding amounts of whole home mortgages 
at the end of each decade from 1950 through 2010. Through 1960, all whole home 
mortgages were directly held in portfolios, and even by 1970 the only exception was $3 
billion of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by the newly established 
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). The largest portfolio investor has 
always been the set of depository institutions, commercial banks and thrift institutions 
(savings and loan associations, savings banks, and credit unions).
2 The market investor 
portfolios include capital market investors ranging from pension funds and mutual funds 
to insurance companies. Starting in 1980, increasing amounts of whole home mortgages 
have been held within MBS pools. The top panel of Table 1 separates the three main 
categories of MBS pools: pools issued by the GSEs, by GNMA, and by private label 
securitizers (PLS). 
                                                 
2 The GSE category covers the Fannie Mae on-balance-sheet portfolio through 1970 and the sum of the 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac portfolios thereafter.  
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The middle panel of Table 1 shows each of the investor categories for whole 
home mortgage holdings as a percentage of the total amount outstanding. One major 
trend is apparent; portfolio holdings declined steadily from 100 percent of the total in 
1960 to 37 percent of the total by 2010. Among the portfolio investors, both depository 
institution and market investor holdings declined steadily starting in 1970. The GSE 
portfolio holdings of whole home mortgages, five percent of the total in 2010, remained a 
small percentage of the total throughout the history, with fluctuations within the narrow 
band of three percent to eight percent of the total. 
The second major trend reported in the middle panel of Table 1 is the steady rise 
in mortgage pool holdings as a percentage of the total, starting at one percent in 1970 and 
reaching 63 percent of the total by 2010. GSE pools show the most rapid rise, reaching 41 
percent of total outstanding home mortgages by 2010. The PLS pools also grew steadily, 
reaching twelve percent of the total by 2010. The GNMA pool share of total outstanding 
mortgages, ten percent at year-end 2010, fluctuated in a narrow range between ten 
percent and fifteen percent of the total from 1980 to the present. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the direct GSE share of the home mortgage 
market, computed as the sum of whole mortgages held in the GSE portfolios and their 
outstanding MBS. While this GSE share rose steadily from 1950, the primary increase 
started in 1990, with the share reaching 46 percent of all outstanding home mortgages in 
2010. This direct share does not include MBS from other issuers that were held in the 
GSE portfolios, a topic to which we turn below.
3 
                                                 
3 Quantitatively, including the GSE holdings of other MBS would raise the total GSE share to 47 percent 
and 48 percent for 2000 and 2010 respectively. This ratio actually peaked in 2003, reaching fifty percent.  
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While Table 1 accounts for all outstanding home mortgages, it does not 
distinguish among the investor groups holding the MBS instruments created by the 
mortgage pools. This issue is addressed in Table 2, in which ownership of the MBS pools 
has been allocated among the various investor classes. These values are then combined 
with the portfolio holdings of whole mortgages to determine the ownership structure of 
all home mortgages, whether held as whole mortgages or as investment in MBS pools.
4 It 
is apparent from Table 2 that, starting in 1980, market investors were expanding relative 
to the depository institutions and the GSEs, and that by 2010 the market investors were 
the largest investor class for the sum of whole mortgages and mortgage securities. 
Figure 1 reports the percentage of outstanding whole mortgages held directly in 
portfolios for each of the three investor classes. The depository institutions have always 
been the predominant holder of whole mortgages. At year-end 2010, the depository 
institutions held 76 percent of all whole mortgages that were directly held in portfolios, 
with the market investors and the GSEs each holding a twelve percent share. 
Figure 2 reports the percentage of outstanding MBS for the three holder classes.
5 
It is apparent that the market investors have always been dominant in holding MBS 
positions. At year-end 2010, market investors were holding 67 percent of the outstanding 
MBS, with depository institutions holding 21 percent and the GSEs twelve percent. 
Figure 3 combines the results for Figures 1 and 2, reporting the share for each 
holder class of their combined positions in whole mortgages and MBS. By 2010, the 
market investors had the largest position, representing 47 percent of all home mortgages, 
                                                 
4 As far as we are aware, this integration of whole mortgage portfolio holdings and MBS pools by investor 
has not been available previously. 
5 The graphs start in 1970, since there were no outstanding MBS before that year.  
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with depository institutions in the second position, holding 41 percent of all home 
mortgages. At the same time, the GSEs were holding twelve percent of all home 
mortgages (as either whole mortgages or MBS) a share just below their average over the 
last three decades. 
Figure 3 indicates that the GSE combined holdings of whole mortgages and MBS 
has always represented a relatively small share of total U.S. home mortgages outstanding. 
In this sense, closing the GSEs now, in an orderly way, would have a minor impact on the 
U.S. mortgage market. That is, the twelve percent GSE share could be readily replaced by 
a combination of market investors and depository institutions (who are already holding 
88 percent of U.S. home mortgages). There are, however, two other measures of potential 
GSE benefits with regard to outstanding whole mortgages and MBS: (1) the contribution 
of MBS issued by the GSEs, and (2) stabilization of the U.S. home mortgage market 
through countercyclical activities by the GSEs. We now consider these in turn. 
A.2    The Role of GSE-Issued MBS 
Figure 4 shows the relative shares of outstanding home mortgage MBS by issuer 
class. The GSE share has been dominant since 1990, representing 65 percent of all 
outstanding MBS in 2010. The share of private label securitizers (PLS) has been steadily 
rising, but still represented only 19 percent of outstanding MBS at year-end 2010. The 
GNMA share has been steadily declining, reaching a 16 percent market share by year-end 
2010. 
The dominant historical position of GSE MBS in the current U.S. home mortgage 
is sometimes used to justify a future role for the GSEs in the market. But, at its core, the 
GSE dominance of the MBS market for home mortgages has been largely derived from  
12 
the assumption of market investors—reinforced by GSE marketing--that the GSE MBS 
had an implicit government guarantee (and which turned out to be correct, after 
imposition of the GSE Conservatorships in 2008). In this sense, the dominant GSE MBS 
position is just an example of crowding out, whereby any asset with a low-cost 
government guarantee against loss will likely replace private activity in the same market. 
If the government guarantee were eliminated, there is every reason to expect that private 
market activity would simply replace the activity of the government entity. 
A brief review of the history of U.S. MBS development is valuable for 
understanding the limited contribution of the GSEs to MBS innovations:
6 
  1968: GNMA creates first modern MBS by securitizing FHA/VA mortgages; 
  1970s: GSEs expand MBS market based on their implicit government guarantee;
7 
  1980s: Salomon Bros. securitizes multi-class, non-guaranteed, MBS instruments;
8 
  1990s: Multi-class (structured finance) mechanism is first applied to wide range of 
asset-backed securities, including auto, credit card, and commercial mortgage loans; 
  2000s: Subprime lending becomes the most important application of MBS/ABS 
methods. 
 
                                                 
6 US mortgage securitization probably actually began soon after the founding of the Republic. Following 
the war of 1812, the US federal government was desperate for revenue and extended loans to homesteaders 
for property on the Western frontiers. Without the resources to make and hold these loans, the government 
pooled and sold these loans to investors. By the 1920s, securitization was already a well accepted format 
for selling loans to investors. These mortgage-backed securities failed during the real estate crisis of the 
1930s, and it was decades before U.S. securitization was reactivated in 1968. See Quinn (2010) for a new 
history of the U.S. housing policy and the origins of securitization. 
7 The GSEs could point to their $2.25 billion line of credit at the US Treasury as backing for their 
guarantee, a significant factor only in the early years when their scale of operations was relatively small. It 
also helped the GSE case that the US government never firmly and officially rejected the notion of an 
implicit guarantee. 
8 The colorful development of private-label MBS under Lewis Ranieri at Solomon Brothers is wonderfully 
chronicled in Liars Poker by Lewis (1990).  
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Credit for the modern innovation of single-class MBS belongs to the government 
itself with the creation of the GNMA MBS. GNMA was, and remains, an agency within 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Likewise, credit for the innovation 
of the multi-class MBS belongs to the private sector with the development of structured 
MBS by Salomon Bros. in the 1980s. In fact, the GSEs have always been followers, not 
innovators, in the MBS market. The success of the GSEs in establishing the market for 
their own MBS depended entirely on the perception of capital market investors that they 
faced no credit risk as the result of the implicit federal guarantee. Absent this government 
guarantee, the single-class GSE MBS would have simply lost out in the marketplace to 
the multi-class, private-label, MBS. 
GSE proponents often argue that the GSEs reduced securitization costs and 
mortgage interest rates. Here, too, the reality is that the GSEs provide no benefit other 
than the implicit guarantee. A case in point is the TBA (“to be announced”) forward 
market for GSE and GNMA MBS. While this market arguably expands the liquidity of 
the traded MBS, the benefit depends completely on the market’s perception that the 
guarantees—explicit for GNMA and implicit for the GSE MBS—make credit risk 
irrelevant in the pricing and trading of the securities. It is equally noteworthy that the 
markets for asset-backed securitization, for the securitization of credit card, auto, and 
commercial mortgage loans, and other loan classes as well, expanded rapidly starting in 
the early 1990s without any contribution from the GSEs. Indeed, as with the original 
GNMA MBS, the GSEs benefited from the innovation by others, creating their own  
14 
structured finance offerings once the market demand for such securities had been 
expanded through private market innovation.
9 
Finally, the claim is sometimes made that the GSE MBS activity is critical for the 
survival of the thirty-year, fixed-rate, residential mortgage. This claim is unwarranted. In 
fact, two features of the GSE MBS instrument were clearly detriments to the expansion 
of the long-term, fixed-rate, mortgage: 
First, the GSE MBS transferred the entire interest rate risk imbedded in the fixed-
rate mortgages to the market investors who purchased the instruments. The GSEs took no 
action to mitigate this risk; 
Second, the GSE MBS generally disallowed prepayment penalties on all the 
mortgages they securitized. While borrowers may have felt they benefitted from this 
“free” call option, it greatly magnified the interest rate risk imposed on investors in the 
GSE MBS, and led to higher interest rates on the fixed-rate mortgages. 
Finally, a number of Western European countries successfully use long-term, 
fixed rate, mortgages, but have no entity comparable to the GSEs, Denmark is the most 
conspicuous example. The use of covered bonds allows European banks to hold long-
term mortgages on their balance sheets, while passing a substantial part of the interest-
rate risk to capital market investors. We further discuss the experience of Western 
European countries in Section A5 below. 
                                                 
9 See Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace (2009) for a discussion of how the GSEs profited by restructuring their 
simple passthrough MBS into more complex multi-tranche securitizations.  
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A.3    The Limited GSE Contributions to Mortgage Market Stability 
The GSEs also claim credit for taking actions to stabilize the U.S. mortgage 
markets. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009), however, finds little 
evidence of such benefits: 
“… the extent to which the enterprises have been able to support a stable 
and liquid secondary mortgage market during periods of economic stress, 
which are key charter and statutory obligations, is not clear. In 1996, we 
attempted to determine the extent to which the enterprises’ activities 
would support mortgage finance during stressful economic periods by 
analyzing Fannie Mae’s mortgage activities in some states, including oil 
producing states such as Texas and Louisiana, beginning in the 1980s. 
Specifically, we analyzed state-level data on Fannie Mae’s market shares 
and housing price indexes for the years 1980–1994. We did not find 
sufficient evidence that Fannie Mae provided an economic cushion to 
mortgage markets in those states during the period analyzed.” 
Reports by the Congressional Budget Office (1996, 2010) come to similar conclusions. 
The academic literature also generally concludes that the GSE contribution to U.S. 
mortgage market stability has been modest at best. This view is stated in early studies by 
Jaffee and Rosen (1978, 1979) and more recent studies by Frame and White (2005) and 
Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund (2008). In contrast, Naranjo and Toevs (2002), a study 
funded by Fannie Mae, found evidence of effective stabilization by the GSEs, as did 
other studies carried out internally by the GSEs. Unlike the previous studies, Peek and 
Wilcox (2003) focused on the flow of mortgage funds, and not on mortgage interest rates, 
and found the GSE contribution to be countercyclical. Of course, this research was all 
conducted before the subprime housing bubble and its collapse. In this event, as we now 
document, the GSE participation was decidedly destabilizing. 
A.4  The GSE Role in the Subprime Mortgage Boom and Crash 
The losses reported by the GSEs starting in 2008 leave no doubt that the GSEs 
acquired a significant volume of risky mortgages during the subprime boom. However,  
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the extent, timing, and significance of these acquisitions is debated. For example, Jaffee 
(2010) describes the GSE role as “expanding” the subprime boom, especially in 2007, 
whereas Wallison (2011, p.2) concludes that GSE activity, based on their housing goals, 
was a primary “source” of the crisis. In this section, we evaluate the role played by the 
GSEs in the subprime mortgage boom and crash. 
A quantitative evaluation of the GSE role in the subprime crisis faces a number of 
significant data issues: 
1)  Definitions for subprime and Alt A mortgages differ across data sets, and certain high-
risk mortgages are not included under either label. 
2)  Defining high-risk mortgages (including subprime and Alt A instruments) is 
necessarily complex because mortgage default risk arises from numerous factors 
including borrower and property attributes (FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, etc.), 
special amortization options (interest only, negative amortization, etc.), and fixed-rate 
versus adjustable-rate loans. 
3)  The GSEs could not acquire any mortgages with an initial loan amount above the 
conforming loan limit (so-called jumbo mortgages). 
Our analysis starts by reviewing a newly compiled mortgage origination dataset 
from the GSE regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (2010a).
10 These data 
compare the risk characteristics of all mortgages acquired by the GSEs (whether 
securitized or held in retained portfolios) with the risk characteristics of all conforming, 
conventional, mortgages that were included in private label securitizations (PLS), 
tabulated by year of mortgage origination. Because the dataset has nearly complete 
coverage and is restricted to conforming mortgages, it provides the best available direct -- 
                                                 
10 We thank Robin Seiler of the Federal Housing Finance Agency for providing us with a roadmap for the 
intricacies of these data.  
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“apples to apples” -- comparison of the GSE acquired mortgages relative to the 
comparable market. Nevertheless, there are two limitations. First, while the FHFA data 
include all the conforming mortgages that collateralized PLS MBS instruments, the GSE 
holdings of PLS tranches are not so identified. We do not expect a significant bias in the 
comparisons from this source, however, because the GSE PLS holdings were almost 
entirely AAA tranches with little ex ante credit risk.
11 Second, the FHFA data exclude 
conforming mortgages that were not securitized (i.e., they were retained in lender 
portfolios). To the extent that lenders did retain conforming mortgages with high-risk 
attributes, the FHFA dataset will undercount the high-risk dimensions of the overall 
conforming origination pools, and will therefore overstate the GSE share of all high-risk 
originations. Here too, we do not expect a significant bias in our comparisons, because 
most subprime and Alt-A mortgages were securitized, and the securitization rate was 
even higher among those high-risk loans that were also conforming mortgages.
12 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the dollar amount of the conforming mortgages by 
origination year and various risk attributes. Rows (1) to (3) report on loans with one of 
the identified high-risk factors: high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, low FICO scores, and 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) respectively. However, there is some double counting 
                                                 
11 See Thomas and Van Order (2011) for further discussion. PLS tranches as a share of total GSE 
acquisitions reached its high point at 22.9 percent in 2005, but had fallen to 7.4 percent by 2007. 
Furthermore, actual cash flow losses on GSE PLS positions have been modest to date, although the GSEs 
have recognized significant mark to market valuation losses on these positions. 
12 For example, 2007 data from Inside Mortgage Finance indicate that only $33 billion (or 7%) of the 
subprime/Alt A mortgages originated that year were not securitized. Even if these were all conforming 
mortgages, their share of total conforming originations that year would be less than 3 percent. Furthermore, 
Inside Mortgage Finance indicates that over 31% of subprime MBS and 9 percent of Alt A MBS in 2007 
were “GSE eligible”—i.e. conforming mortgages eligible for GSE purchase--further reducing the incentive 
of portfolio lenders to hold these mortgages in unsecuritized form. It is also noteworthy that while there is 
no consensus conclusion from the expanding literature on whether securitization created lax underwriting 
standards—see for example the contrast between Bubb and Kaufman (2009) and Keys etal. (2010)—there 
is no finding that portfolio lenders were systematically retaining high-risk mortgages.  
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since some loans have more than one of these attributes. The aggregate high-risk 
originations shown in row (4) net out all double counting.
13 Row (6) shows the 
percentage of high-risk mortgages as a share of total conforming mortgages (in row 5). 
This high-risk share of total conforming originations rose steadily through 2004 and then 
declined steadily thereafter. 
Panel B of Table 3 computes the share of the conforming mortgages acquired by 
the GSEs—whether as backing for guaranteed MBS or to hold on their balance sheets--
for each risk attribute. For example, in 2001, the GSEs acquired about 92.2 percent of all 
conforming mortgages with LTV ratios above 90 percent. For all 3 of the risk attributes, 
the GSE share fell steadily through 2005 and then expanded rapidly through 2007. By 
2007, the GSEs were acquiring 79.9 percent of the high-risk, conforming, mortgage 
originations. In interpreting these numbers, however, it must be recognized that, as shown 
in row (11), the GSEs represent a large share of the overall conforming mortgage market; 
as their overall market share approaches 100 percent, their share of each risk attribute 
would necessarily do the same. 
Panel C corrects for the large GSE share of the conforming market by computing 
a “relative intensity,” dividing the GSE market share for each risk attribute in Panel B by 
the overall GSE market share in Row (11). A coefficient of one indicates the GSEs are 
holding the “market portfolio,” whereas coefficients below one indicate they are avoiding 
risky mortgages and coefficients above one indicate the GSEs are actively acquiring risky 
mortgages. The pattern for each of the three risk attributes shows the relative intensity 
                                                 
13 For example, for the fixed-rate mortgage originations in 2007, 2.2 percent had LTV > 90 percent and 
FICO score < 620. For adjustable rate mortgages in 2007, 19.2 percent had either LTV > 90 percent or 
FICO score < 620. Overall, in 2007 4.7 percent of the originated mortgages had more than one of the high-
risk attributes.  
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rising steadily starting in 2005. In each case, the high point of the seven-year history was 
reached in 2007. Since the relative intensities over the full time span are generally less 
than one, it would appear the GSEs were not leading the market for high-risk lending as 
the subprime boom took off.
14 But the jumps in the relative intensities in 2007 for most of 
the indicators suggest that the GSEs then rapidly expanded their participation in the 
subprime boom. This is one key basis for our conclusion that the GSEs were a 
destabilizing influence on the conforming mortgage market as the subprime boom headed 
to its peak in 2007. 
The analysis has so far focused on the GSE acquisition of high-risk mortgages as 
a share of the overall conforming mortgage market. We now consider the GSE 
acquisition of high risk mortgages as a share of their total acquisitions. Table 4 reports 
the first three attributes high LTV ratios; low FICO scores; and ARMs; as reported in 
Table 3. The time pattern is again distinctive, with the share of the GSEs new business 
dedicated to mortgages with these high-risk attributes generally rising starting in 2004, 
the only exception being the declining share of ARM acquisitions by Fannie Mae. The 
companies also reported their acquisitions of interest-only, condo/coop, and investor 
mortgages; and here too the pattern is generally rising from 2004. 2007 represents the 
year of maximum share for each high-risk mortgage attribute with the exception of 
Fannie Mae ARMs and Freddie Mac interest-only mortgages. These data thus present a 
second independent basis for our conclusion that the GSEs were a decidedly destabilizing 
influence on the conforming mortgage market as the subprime boom headed to its peak in 
2007. 
                                                 
14 Thomas and Van Order (2011), although using different datasets, come to the same conclusion.  
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A.5    Mortgage Markets Without GSEs 
The analysis above leaves little doubt that the GSEs destabilized the U.S. 
mortgage market during the later stages of the subprime boom, but there is a further 
question how the U.S. mortgage markets would function without the GSEs. To help 
answer this, in this section we consider evidence from two sources: (1) how the U.S. 
mortgage markets have performed without GSEs, and (2) the performance of the 
mortgage markets in Western European countries.  
The evidence that private mortgage markets have operated effectively in the U.S. 
economy can be summarized with three comments on the historical role of private 
markets within the U.S. mortgage market. First, private markets have always originated 
100% of U.S. mortgages, and closing the GSEs would not affect this. Second, the GSEs 
have never held a significant share of the outstanding U.S. home mortgages, this share 
being, for example, 12 percent at year-end 2010. Third, the GSE MBS share of total 
home mortgages first exceeded 30% only in 2007. This confirms that the private 
markets—depository institutions and capital market investors--are capable of holding or 
securitizing the large majority of U.S. mortgages. It is also noteworthy that the market for 
jumbo mortgages—mortgages that exceed the conforming loan limit--has generally 
functioned quite satisfactorily.  
Turning to the European evidence, the European economies and housing markets 
are sufficiently similar to the U.S. to provide a potentially interesting comparison, while 
they have the key distinction that government intervention in these housing and mortgage 
markets is far less than for the U.S.; in particular, none of these countries has entities with  
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any significant resemblance to the U.S. GSEs.
15 This conclusion is stated very clearly by 
Coles and Hardt (2000, p. 778):
16 
“There is no national or European government agency to help lenders fund 
their loans. Mortgage loans have to be funded on the basis of the financial 
strength of banks or the intrinsic quality of the securities. EU Law (Article 
87 and 88 of the EC treaty) outlaws state aid in the form of guarantees as 
there may be an element of competitive distortion.” 
Table 5 compares the U.S. and Western European mortgage markets for a range 
of quantitative attributes from 1998 to 2010 based on a comprehensive data base of 
housing and mortgage data for fifteen European countries from the European Mortgage 
Federation (2010). Column 1 compares the most recent owner occupancy rates for the 
U.S. and European countries. The U.S. value is 66.9 percent, which is just below its peak 
subprime boom value. It is frequently suggested that the high rate of homeownership is 
the result of the large U.S. government support of the mortgage market, including the 
GSEs. It is thus highly revealing that the U.S. rate is just at the median— eight of the 
European countries have higher owner occupancy rates—and slightly below the average 
value for the European countries. Furthermore, the lower owner occupancy rates in some 
of the countries, Germany for example, appear to be the result of cultural preferences 
rather than government inaction. A full analysis of the determinants of owner occupancy 
rates across countries should also control for the age distribution of the population, since 
younger households, and possibly the oldest households, may have lower ownership rates 
in all countries. Chirui and Jappelli (2003) provide a start in this direction, showing that 
lower downpayment rates are a significant factor encouraging owner occupancy after 
                                                 
15 See European Central Bank (2009) for an extensive review of housing finance in the European Union 
countries. 
16 Hardt was the Secretary General of the European Mortgage Federation at the time.  
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controlling for the population age structure in a sample of fourteen OCED countries. The 
U.S. has also generally benefitted from very low downpayment rates, but it still has an 
average ownership rate, reinforcing the conclusion that the government interventions 
have been largely ineffective in raising the U.S. home ownership rate relative to its peers. 
Column 2 measures the volatility of housing construction activity from 1998 to 
2010 based on the coefficient of variation of housing starts as a measure of relative 
volatility. The U.S. relative volatility is third highest out of the 16 countries, implying 
that the government interventions have failed to reduce U.S. housing cycles relative to 
those in Western Europe. Column 3 measures the volatility of house price changes based 
on the standard deviation of the annual house price appreciation from 1998 through 2010. 
Here the U.S. stands fifth, meaning the country has faced a relatively high rate of house 
price volatility. This negative result is all the more significant because the U.S. is far 
larger than any of the individual European countries, and thus the benefits of regional 
diversification should have lowered the observed U.S. volatility. 
Column 4 compares the level of mortgage interest rates in Western Europe and 
the U.S., using “representative variable mortgage rates” for Europe and the Freddie Mac 
one-year ARM commitment rate for the U.S. The column shows that the U.S. has the 
sixth highest average mortgage interest rate from 1998 to 2010, and exceeds the Western 
European average by 27 basis points. Since overall interest rates also vary across 
countries, as a further test, column 5 shows the average spread between the mortgage rate 
and the Treasury bill rate for each country. The U.S. ranks third highest based on the 
spread and exceeds the Western European average by 70 basis points. Of course, 
numerous factors determine these mortgage rates and spreads, including the precise terms  
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of the variable rate mortgages, other contract features such as downpayment 
requirements, and the generally greater credit risk of U.S. mortgages. Nevertheless, the 
fact remains that despite the government subsidies and other interventions in the U.S. 
residential mortgage markets, U.S. mortgage rates have remained among the highest 
levels compared with the countries of Western Europe. Finally, Column 6 shows the 
20109 ratio of home mortgages outstanding to each country’s annual GDP, a standard 
measure of the depth of a country’s mortgage market. The U.S. ratio is 75.5 percent 
which puts it sixth within this group of sixteen developed economies. A relatively high 
U.S. result would be expected, given the large mortgage subsidies provided through the 
GSEs and other channels. It is noteworthy, therefore, that five Western European 
countries achieved even higher ratios without substantial government interventions in 
their mortgage markets 
The overall conclusion has to be that Western European mortgage and housing 
markets have outperformed the U.S. markets over the full range of available measures. 
Although data are not provided here, a similar conclusion would hold for the Australian 
and Canadian mortgage markets; see Lea (2010). There are, of course, a wide range of 
possible explanations for the superior performance of the European mortgage markets. 
The key point for present purposes is simply that the superior performance of the 
European mortgage markets is not explained by greater government intervention. In the 
absence of GSEs, almost all Western European mortgage lending is carried out privately 
by banks, primarily funded by bank deposits or covered bonds. Other indirect forms of 
government support, such as the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes 
are also notably absent in most European countries.  
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B.  Other Justifications for GSE Subsidies 
The activities of the GSEs are justified by the particular benefits accruing to 
specific classes of borrowers, or more specifically, to all home purchasers and 
homeowners from the activities supported by these institutions. As noted above, benefits 
have been claimed for the stabilization of the mortgage supply and corresponding 
reductions in the volatility of housing construction and home sales. But there are at least 
three other classes of potential benefits arising from the GSE: 
Increases in the extent of mortgage credit accruing to income and demographic 
groups that policy-makers appear to have deemed particularly deserving -- credit which 
augments that supplied by the private marketplace; 
Increases in the lending support provided to builders, owners, or residents of 
specific types of housing, e.g., multifamily rental housing, which would otherwise not be 
provided in the market; 
Subsidies accruing more broadly to housing market participants, for example, to 
all home purchasers in the form of lower interest costs arising from the increased 
liquidity afforded by the GSEs and the implicit guarantee of repayment provided by those 
institutions; 
This section reviews the evidence on the extent and distribution of these benefits. 
1.  Increased Credit to Targeted Groups and Geographical Areas 
The original charter establishing Fannie Mae as a GSE in 1968 recognized a 
“national goal of providing adequate housing for low and moderate income households,” 
and it authorized the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) to require that a reasonable portion of Fannie Mae’s purchases of home  
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mortgages be related to this goal. Although regulations requiring the GSEs to allocate a 
fixed percentage of mortgage purchases to lower-income households were advanced in 
the 1970s, mandatory rules were not proposed in Congress until after the passage of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989. 
Ultimately, the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 
modified and made more explicit the “housing goals” to be promoted by the GSEs. The 
Act directed the HUD Secretary to establish quantitative goals for mortgages to “low- 
and moderate-income” households and for mortgages originated in “underserved areas.” 
It also imposed a “special affordable housing goal” for mortgages for low-income 
housing in low-income areas. The 1992 legislation stipulated two-year transition goals, 
but after that period, the HUD Secretary was empowered to promulgate more detailed 
regulations. 
Under the HUD regulations, finalized in December 1995, the first goal (“low- and 
moderate-income housing”) directs that a specified fraction of new loans purchased each 
year by the GSEs be originated by households with incomes below the area median. The 
second goal (“underserved areas”) requires that a specified fraction of mortgages be 
originated in census tracts with median incomes less than 90 percent of the area median, 
or else in census tracts with a minority population of at least 30 percent and with a tract 
median income of less than 120 percent of area median income. The third goal (“special 
affordable housing”) targets mortgages originated in tracts with family incomes less than 
60 percent of the area median; or else mortgages in tracts with incomes less than 80 
percent of area median and also located in specific low-income areas. Any single 
mortgage can “count” towards more than one of these goals. (For example, any loan that  
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meets the “special affordable housing” goal also counts towards the “low- and moderate-
income” goal.) 
The numerical goals originally set by HUD for 1996 were modest – requiring, for 
example, that 40 percent of the GSEs’ mortgage purchases be loans made to households 
with incomes below the area median. Over time, the goals for new business set by HUD 
have been increased.
17 The goal for mortgages to low- and moderate-income households 
has been increased from 40 percent in 1996 to 56 percent by 2008. Until 2007, mortgage 
originations by both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had reached their primary goals every 
year. The HUD goal for “underserved areas” was increased from 21 percent in 1996 to 39 
percent in 2008. Originations by the larger GSE, Fannie Mae, exceeded this goal in every 
year; originations by Freddie Mac exceeded the goal in each year until 2008. The “special 
affordable” housing goal was increased by HUD from 12 percent in 1996 to 27 percent in 
2008. Both GSEs surpassed this goal in loan originations each year until 2008. 
Figures 5, 6, and 7 report the HUD goals and GSE progress in achieving those 
goals from their publication in 1995 to the federal takeover of the GSEs in 2008. 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 provide another perspective on the magnitude of the goals set 
by HUD for the GSEs. They report each of the three goals as well as an estimate of the 
share of all newly-issued mortgages in each of the categories. For example, in 2000 the 
HUD-specified “low- and moderate-income goal” was to reach 42 percent of new 
purchases for the GSEs. However, in 2000 low- and moderate-income mortgages, 
according to the same definition, constituted about 59 percent of all new mortgages. At 
                                                 
17 Note, however, that at the time that the 1992 act was debated in Congress, only 36 percent of Fannie 
Mae’s single-family deliveries were for housing whose value was below the area median. (See FHFA 
Mortgage Market Note, The Housing Goals of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, February 1, 2010.)  
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that time, the “underserved areas” goal was 21 percent of GSE mortgages, while these 
mortgages constituted more than a 30 percent market share of new mortgages. In virtually 
all cases, the goals imposed were a good bit lower than the share of mortgage loans of 
that type originated in the economy. There is no evidence that the goals were set so that 
the GSEs would “lead the market” in servicing these groups of households. 
2.  Increased Credit to Targeted Housing Types: Multifamily 
Numerical goals for purchases of multifamily mortgages are not mentioned in the 
Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, but there was considerable concern at the 
time that the GSEs were not financing their “fair share” of multifamily housing, 
especially small multifamily properties. For example, in 1991, small multifamily units 
accounted for less than five percent of Freddie Mac’s multifamily unit purchases. At that 
time, small multifamily units constituted 39 percent of all recently-financed multifamily 
units. (See Herbert, 2001.) Thus, the first rules for implementing the 1992 Act put 
forward by HUD also included explicit goals for multifamily housing. 
These goals have been in the form of dollar-based targets. Goals in 1996-2000 
were approximately 0.8 percent of the mortgage purchases of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac recorded in 1994; goals in 2001-2004 (2005-2007) were 1.0 percent of each GSE’s 
estimated mortgage purchases in 1997-1999 (2000-2002). Beyond the achievement of 
these numerical goals, multifamily mortgage purchases also qualified for “bonus points” 
towards the achievement of the three goals specified in the 1992 law. It has been argued 
that these “bonus points” (discontinued in 2004) were a major inducement leading to an 
increase in participation by the GSEs in the multifamily housing market, particularly in 
their financing of small multifamily properties. (See Manchester, 2007.)  
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Figure 11 reports the dollar goals for multifamily dwellings specified by HUD 
regulations and the performance of each of the GSEs. As noted in the figure, until quite 
recently purchases of multifamily dwellings exceeded the HUD goal by a substantial 
amount. 
V.  Broad Benefits to Homeowners and Purchasers 
a. The Effectiveness of the GSE Goals in Directing Mortgage Credit 
Of course, the finding that the GSEs have achieved the annual goals specified in 
regulations need not imply that Freddie and Fannie have been very effective in increasing 
mortgage credit to targeted groups. For example, many suggest that the numerical goals 
set for the GSEs have been far too low (e.g., Weicher, 2010), and that, as a result the 
GSEs have simply followed the market with a lag of a few years. Indeed, the data in 
Figures 5, 6 and 7, provide no evidence that Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae purchased more 
than their “fair share” of mortgages in any of these areas of congressional concern. GSE 
purchases of mortgages that satisfied any of these congressional goals – as a fraction of 
all new purchases – were consistently smaller than their “market share” in all newly-
issued mortgages. 
Similarly, Figure 11 indicates that the GSEs’ new purchases of “special 
multifamily” mortgages greatly exceeded the dollar goals mandated by HUD in every 
year. 
Finally, Figure 12 demonstrates that the GSEs’ multifamily housing business was 
only a small fraction of the mortgage purchases of the GSEs in any year. It never 
amounted to even seven percent of either GSEs’ purchases.  
29 
Figure 13 reports the aggregate amount of commercial mortgage backed security 
(CMBS) and multifamily originations between 2003 and 2009 as reported by the 
Mortgage Bankers of America. Mortgage originations by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae 
were small – less than $9 billion in any year. Until 2008, GSE originations were less than 
twenty percent of all such mortgage banker mortgage originations. Note, however that in 
2008-2009, CMBS and commercial banks left the market entirely; originations by life 
insurers declined as well. Since the conservatorship in 2008, virtually all multifamily 
mortgages have been originated by the GSEs. 
These simple comparisons suggest that any causal effect of the GSEs on lending 
to  specific income classes, neighborhoods, and property types is not likely to be large –at 
least before 2008. Economic analysis of the potential impacts of the GSEs is also 
complicated by other public programs in effect. For example, in 1977, the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed to encourage banks to exert further efforts to meet 
the credit needs of their local communities, including lower-income areas. In identifying 
neighborhoods of special concern in administering the CRA, neighborhoods (census 
tracts) with median incomes below 80 percent of the area median income are targeted. As 
noted above, “underserved areas” of concern in GSE regulation are census tracts with 
median incomes below 90 percent of the area median income. In addition, many 
borrowers targeted under GSE criteria are also eligible for Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) loans or Veterans’ Administration (subsidized) loans. 
The existence of parallel government programs under the CRA, FHA, and VA 
raises the possibility that the GSE purchases of qualifying mortgages simply displaced 
lenders who would have made the same mortgage under one of the other programs. To  
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the extent that this has been the case, the GSE purchases would have had no noticeable 
impact on the mortgage market for the qualifying borrowers. Of course, it is a subtle 
empirical problem to determine whether the GSE purchases were simply displacing loans 
from the other programs. Nevertheless, a number of academic papers have sought to 
identify and quantify the effects of the GSE goals on local and neighborhood housing 
markets and on classes of borrowers. 
Table 6 summarizes much of this research. 
An early paper by Canner, Passmore and Surette (1996) examined loans eligible 
for insurance under the FHA. The authors evaluated how the risk associated with these 
loans is distributed among government mortgage institutions, private mortgage insurers, 
the GSEs, and banks’ in-house portfolios. The results indicated that FHA bears the 
largest risk share associated with lending to lower-income and minority populations, with 
the GSEs lagging far behind. Bostic and Gabriel (2006) analyzed the effects of the GSE 
mortgage purchase goals upon homeownership and housing conditions in California. A 
careful comparison of neighborhoods just above the GSE cutoff for “low-moderate-
income” and “special affordable” designation with nearby neighborhoods just below the 
cutoff found essentially no differences in the levels and differences in home-ownership 
rates and housing conditions during the decade of the 1990s. 
In a more sophisticated analysis using a similar comparison of neighborhoods 
“just above” and “just below” the GSE cutoff, An, et al, (2007) focused on three 
indicators of local housing markets: the home ownership rate, the vacancy rate, and the 
median home value. The authors related (an instrument for) the intensity of GSE activity 
in a census tract to these outcomes, using a variety of control variables. The results  
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indicated that increases in GSE purchase intensity were associated with significant but 
very small declines in neighborhood vacancy rates and increases in median house values. 
The authors conclude that the “results do not indicate much efficacy of the GSE 
affordable housing loan-purchase targets in improving housing market conditions (2007, 
p. 235).” 
Two papers by Bhutta (2009b, 2010) adopted a regression discontinuity design to 
test the effects of the “underserved areas” goal upon the supply of credit to those areas. 
Rather than attempt to match similar neighborhoods for statistical analysis, Bhutta 
exploited the facts that census tracts qualified for CRA scrutiny if their median incomes 
were 80 percent of the local area, and they qualified for scrutiny under the HUD GSE 
goals if their median incomes were 90 percent of the area median design. Bhutta merged 
tract-level data on mortgages (from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act) with 
neighborhood (census) data. Bhutta’s results (2009a) do find a significant effect of the 
“underserved area” goal on GSE purchasing activity – but the effect is very small (2-3 
percent during the 1997-2002 period). 
A more recent paper by Moulton (2010), also using a regression discontinuity 
approach, finds no effect of the GSEs -- on individual loans rather than aggregate credit 
allocations. Moulton uses micro data on mortgage loan applications to examine whether 
the GSE’s affordable housing goals altered the probability that a loan application was 
originated by a mortgage lending institution or that a loan was purchased by one of the 
GSEs. The analysis led to the conclusion that the GSE affordable housing goal had no 
effect at all on mortgage lending or on GSE purchases.  
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The consistent finding of little or no effect of the GSE goals on housing 
outcomes, mortgage applications, or mortgage finance could suggest that there is little 
effect of the GSE rules upon FHA lending as well. But several papers have reported that 
an increased market share of GSE mortgages in a census tract is associated with a decline 
in the FHA share of mortgages (An and Bostic, 2008; Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2010). 
These results may explain why the increases in lending mandated by the HUD 
regulations to achieve the congressional goals of the 1992 Act have had very little net 
impact on housing and neighborhood outcomes. Small increases in GSE activity have 
been offset by roughly comparable declines in FHA activity. 
The extent to which an expansion of GSE activity simply crowds out private 
mortgage purchases remains an open research question. For example, Gabriel and 
Rosenthal (2010) argue that increased GSE activity in the mortgage market involved little 
or no crowd-out until about 2005. After that, GSE activity crowded out private activity 
until the crash in mortgage markets in 2007. 
But even if there were a complete crowd-out of private mortgage activity arising 
from GSE behavior , it is hard to attribute any of this to the goals set by the 1992 Act – 
especially since the goals were substantially less than the share of these new mortgages in 
the market. 
To summarize: the academic and scientific literature has generally found little 
effect from housing goals as they operated through the GSEs. The goals were low. 
Despite appearances, they provided no incentive for the GSEs to “lead the market” in 
providing credit to potentially riskier housing investments. They accomplished nothing in 
increasing credit for riskier loans.  
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But there is a view that the housing goals were actively harmful in facilitating the 
subprime housing crisis. 
This position has been put most forcefully by Peter Wallison (2011) in his rebuttal 
statement to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. He argues that the requirement to 
meet the housing goals “forced” the GSEs to make substandard loans, which is why they 
ultimately acquired such large positions in subprime mortgages and subprime mortgage 
securities. Indeed, Wallison claims that the HUD goals actually “caused” the subprime 
crisis. There is no question that the GSEs ultimately acquired large portfolios of subprime 
mortgages and securities -- see our discussion in Section IV.A.4 above -- but Wallison 
provides no evidence at all that these subprime portfolios had anything to do with the 
GSE goals. 
However, an impressive journalistic account of recent history in the mortgage 
market argues forcefully that the housing goals in the 1992 act led directly to the 
subprime mortgage debacle of 2008 (Morgenson and Rossner, 2011). Our analysis of the 
academic literature supports no such claim. It is certainly possible that the passionate 
rhetoric from the GSEs provided a convenient “cover” for the trend towards lower 
quality, even toxic, mortgages by 2004-2005. However, there is no evidence that this 
rhetoric increased GSE lending to targeted groups during the 1990s. Ironically (or 
perhaps diabolically), the rhetoric about “affordable housing” from the GSEs had little 
effect upon their own mortgage purchases until the subprime crisis was well underway. 
As noted above, the empirical evidence simply fails to support a claim that the 
GSE housing goals were a primary source of the subprime crisis. First, there are simple 
questions of timing. The GSE goals were enunciated in a law passed in 1992; it is  
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implausible that their effect was not felt until a quarter century had elapsed. Further, as 
noted below, the GSE accumulation of subprime mortgages accelerated only in 2007, too 
late to have “caused’ the subprime bubble (but certainly early enough to have accelerated 
it). 
Second, as noted above, it appears that the GSE mortgage purchases in support of 
the housing goals were principally loans that would otherwise have been made by other 
lenders. 
Most importantly, the subprime crisis has a long list of proximate causes, 
including U.S. monetary policy, a global savings glut, the error of assuming a national 
housing pricing collapse was highly unlikely, etc. (see Jaffee, 2009 for further 
discussion.) 
b.      Benefits to all housing market participants 
There has been active research seeking to establish the value of the enhanced 
liquidity and subsidy to homeowners. In principle, the subsidy provided by the implicit 
guarantee can be calculated. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae issue debt in the same market 
as other participants in the banking and finance industry participate. The yield difference 
(“spread”) between the debt of the GSEs and that of other firms can be applied to the 
newly issued GSE debt to compute the funding advantage in any year arising from the 
GSE status. Of course, it is not quite straightforward to apply this principle and to 
produce credible estimates. The relevant benchmark estimate (i.e., the appropriate sector 
and bond rating) is not without controversy, and a comparison with broad aggregate 
indices combines bonds containing a variety of embedded options. Pearce and Miller 
(2001), among others, reported comparisons of GSE and AA-rated financial firms,  
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suggesting that the agencies enjoyed a 37 basis point (bps) spread. More sophisticated 
comparisons by Nothaft, et al, (2002) suggest that the relative spreads are about 27 bps 
(vis-à-vis AA-minus firms). Table 7 summarizes available comparisons. A careful 
analysis of yields at issue for GSE debt and the option-free debt issued by a selection of 
finance industry corporations (Ambrose and Warga, 2002) concludes that the GSEs enjoy 
a spread of 25-29 bps over AA bank bonds and 37-46 over AA financials. Quigley (2006) 
provides a terse summary of available estimates.
18 
The substantial subsidies arising from the funding advantage of the GSEs means 
that mortgage rates for all homeowners can be lower than they otherwise would be, that 
is, the subsidy can improve the well-being of homeowners and home purchasers. 
But of course, in the first instance the subsidy is provided directly to private 
profit-making firms with fiduciary duties to their shareholders. It is thus not obvious that 
all, or even most, of the funding advantage provided by the public subsidy is passed 
through to homeowners. As documented by Hermalin and Jaffee (1996), the secondary 
market for mortgage securities (at least for those securities composed of loans 
comparable to the rules under which Fannie and Freddie operate) is hardly a textbook 
model of atomistic competition. The two GSEs are large, and each has a large market 
share of the conforming segment of the market. There are high barriers to entry, and the 
MBS product is more-or-less homogeneous. Moreover, mortgage originators have an 
inherent first-mover advantage in deciding which newly-issued mortgages to sell to 
Fannie and Freddie. This may force the GSEs to pay a premium for the mortgages they 
                                                 
18 These estimates are in the range of the spreads which have been assumed (41 bps) by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO, 2001) in estimating the annual federal subsidy to the GSEs. They are similar to the 
estimates of spreads (40 bps) used by Passmore, (2005) in a more recent exercise.  
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purchase in the market. These factors, duopoly and adverse selection, may mean that 
much of the subsidy accrues to the shareholders of the GSEs or to the owners of other 
financial institutions, not to homeowners or home purchasers. 
The effects of the GSEs upon mortgage rates can be calculated by estimating the 
spread between the interest rates on mortgages which conform to the loan limits and 
underwriting guidelines of the GSEs and the rates on otherwise comparable mortgages. 
As in the analysis of funding advantages, it is not quite straightforward to apply this 
principle and to produce credible estimates. (For example, most research compares the 
rates paid by borrowers with loans one dollar below the conforming limit with rates paid 
by borrowers with loans one dollar above the limit. But the latter group of borrowers 
differs from the former group, or else they surely would have made an additional cash 
payment and taken a conforming loan.)
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Early analyses, e.g. by Hendershott and Shilling (1989) comparing interest rates 
on jumbo and conforming mortgages, indicated that this spread was 24-39 bps. More 
recent studies, e.g., by Passmore, et al (2002), by McKenzie (2002), and by the CBO 
(2001), conclude that the spread is 18-23 bps. These more recent studies differ mostly in 
their application of more complex screens to insure comparable data for conforming and 
nonconforming loans. Table 8 summarizes these comparisons. More recent work by 
Passmore, et al (2005) suggests that this spread may be as low as 16 bps. 
                                                 
19 Of course, other reasons besides the greater liquidity provided by the GSEs could explain some of an 
observed spread between jumbo and conforming mortgages. Jumbo mortgages are generally prepaid more 
aggressively -- borrowers have more at stake, if nothing else. This means that investors will require higher 
rates on jumbos merely to compensate for the increased prepayment risk. On the other hand, borrowers 
with jumbo mortgages have better credit, and they make larger down payments, which should create lower 
rates on jumbo mortgages. See, also, Ambrose, et al (2001), Heuson, et al (2001), or Woodward (2004b).  
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In summary, it appears that the GSEs’ funding advantage is about 30-40 bps, and 
the effect of this is to reduce mortgage rates by 16-25 bps. Stated another way, on the 
order of half of the subsidy rate to the GSEs is transmitted to homeowners in the form of 
reduced mortgage interest rates. Presumably, the remainder is transmitted to the 
managers of the GSEs, the shareholders of the enterprises or to the owners of other 
financial institutions.
20 
VI.  Where Do We Go From Here? 
As noted in the introduction, most commentators agree that the current structure 
of the housing finance system must be reformed in the very near term. A question of first-
order importance  is then the likely consequences of the role of government in support of 
the U.S. housing and mortgage markets, whether as a modification or replacement of the 
GSEs. 
The research results reported in this paper make it clear, we think, that the public 
benefits arising from the GSEs have been quite small. The establishment of Fannie Mae, 
a half century ago, and the establishment of Freddie Mac, forty years ago, did stimulate a 
more stable national market for housing finance and did substantially improve the 
liquidity and access of the market. As reported above, however, the specific benefits 
arising from the GSE structure have been minor. In any event, these benefits -- with some 
contributions from the GSEs -- were achieved by the 1980s. There now exists a national 
market for home mortgages. The GSEs have followed reform in the secondary market 
and have benefited from private innovation. 
                                                 
20 Of course, the net effects of the GSEs upon public welfare and the economy has greatly exceed the three 
effects upon housing market participants discussed here. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the macro 
economic effects of the structure and operation of the GSEs during the past half decade has been much 
more important for the economy than the direct housing-market effects of the institutions.  
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There have been surprisingly few benefits to deserving households or 
neighborhoods which can be attributed to the GSEs. There has been more political or 
partisan attention to the cause of homeownership among lower-income households as a 
result of powerful advocacy by the interests of GSEs, but there is little evidence that 
lower-income homeownership was stimulated at all, at least not until the run up to the 
housing bubble. 
It is true that the GSE structure has reduced interest rates on home mortgages, by 
about a quarter percent or so. But this benefit to homeowners has arisen from the federal 
guarantee for GSE debt. And the public cost of the subsidy has been far more than the 
benefits of lower interest rates to homeowners. About half of the overall subsidy has 
accrued to GSE employees, shareholders, and other market intermediaries. These large 
losses are directly attributable to the GSE structure which was created in 1968. 
As noted below, we also conclude that the structure of the GSEs themselves has 
made regulation of the housing market far less transparent and has extended some of the 
consequences of the housing bubble of the past half decade. 
A.  The Appropriate Role for Government in the U.S. Residential Mortgage 
Market 
If the GSEs in current form are to be closed, the fundamental policy question is to 
decide which government interventions, if any, should replace GSE functions and which 
should be performed by the private sector? Once that is decided, there is also the delicate 
issue of how to manage the transition from the current GSE conservatorship. Fortunately, 
there are two quite flexible instruments available to close down the GSEs in a smooth, 
safe and dependable manner: (i) steadily reduce the conforming loan limit until it reaches  
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zero; and (ii) steadily raise the fee charged by the GSEs for guaranteeing MBS. Although 
we will return to questions of the dynamic transition below, the key question is to 
determine the appropriate role of government in the U.S. mortgage market. 
A large number of proposals have been offered for the reform of the U.S. 
mortgage market, ranging from a mortgage market managed primarily by private sector 
entities to recreation of the GSEs as public/private hybrids (albeit with new controls). 
Summaries and analyses of the general approaches are available in U.S. General 
Accountability Office (2009), Congressional Budget Office (2010), and Bernanke (2008). 
The following is an annotated list of the three primary proposals scrutinized: 
  Reestablish GSEs with tighter controls and explicit guarantees. The entities would 
continue their organization as public/private hybrids, but with tight government 
controls, sometimes described as a “public utility” model. In most plans, the 
government guarantees would apply to the underlying mortgages, not the newly 
created entities. A cooperative structure such as that of the current Federal Home 
Loan Banks is an alternative version. The number of entities to be chartered varies by 
proposal. 
  Restructure GSE functions explicitly within a government agency. A simple version 
would create a government agency that would explicitly insure mortgages up to some 
conforming limit and then securitize pools of these mortgages, very much as the 
current FHA and GNMA agencies operate. The support for underserved borrowers 
and areas, including multi-family housing, currently covered under the GSE housing 
goals, would then continue in a revised form as explicit government programs.  
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  Privatization of the U.S. mortgage market. This proposal would create a fully 
privatized mortgage market, with no special federal backing for the secondary 
mortgage market, although this could include spinning out the GSEs as new private 
entities. 
More recently, in February 2011, the U.S. Treasury and Housing and Urban 
Development agency, U.S. Treasury/HUD 2011), issued a white paper that offered an 
alternative list of three policy options. The policy options were based on three principles 
(White paper, p. 11): 
1. Pave the way for a robust private mortgage market by reducing government support for 
housing finance and closing down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on a responsible 
timeline; 
2. Address fundamental flaws in the mortgage market to protect borrowers, to help ensure 
transparency for investors, and to increase the role of private capital; 
3. Target the government's vital support for affordable housing in a “more effective and 
transparent manner.” 
In effect, these principles rule out the reestablishment of the GSEs as 
private/public hybrids. 
The White paper then offers three options for long-term mortgage market reform: 
Option 1: A privatized system of housing finance with the government insurance role 
limited to FHA, USDA and Department of Veterans’ Affairs’ assistance for narrowly 
targeted groups of borrowers.  
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Option 2: A privatized system of housing finance with assistance from FHA, USDA and 
the VA for narrowly targeted groups of borrowers and a guarantee mechanism to scale up 
during times of crisis. 
Option 3: A privatized system of housing finance with FHA, USDA and the VA 
assistance for low- and moderate-income borrowers and catastrophic reinsurance behind 
significant private capital. 
Since the publication of the White paper, most discussions of specific proposals 
among academics, public interest groups, and market participants have centered on 
versions of the “Option 3.” The alternative views expressed in these discussions mainly 
concern the extent and form in which the government’s mortgage guarantees would be 
provided. Of course, if the government guarantee is sufficiently limited, “option 3” is no 
different from “option 2.” While these discussions have focused on the form of the 
government mortgage guarantee, most commentators agree that the abusive mortgage 
market practices that evolved during the subprime boom must be ended through 
regulation; see U.S. Treasury/HUD (2011, pp.15-18). In fact, Federal Reserve (2008) 
actions to modify the Truth in Lending Act and a wide range of requirements in the 
Dodd-Frank Act have already gone a long way to eliminating any possible replay of such 
abusive practices in the U.S. mortgage market. Most commentators also appear to agree 
that the GSE housing goals should be replaced with an explicit and transparent system of 
targeted support for access and affordability. An obvious solution, and one endorsed by 
the White Paper, is to strengthen and expand the FHA for this purpose. The White Paper 
also proposes a public commitment to affordable rental housing.  
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B.  Government Insurance of U.S. Mortgages 
We now review the major issues and differences among the plans that are 
proposed as the mechanism to replace the GSEs with a program of federal government 
mortgage insurance. Specific versions are available from Acharya, Richardson Van 
Nieuwerburgh, and White (2011), the Center for American Progress (2010), Ellen, Tye, 
and Willis (2010), and Hancock and Passmore (2010). While the plans differ in details 
and specificity, a composite can be summarized: 
1) The plans anticipate government regulations will set the underwriting standards to be 
met by all mortgages that underlie the qualifying MBS, roughly comparable to the 
standards historically applied by the GSEs. The plans also generally anticipate a size limit 
roughly equivalent to the conforming loan limit historically applied to the GSEs; 
2) Investors in the qualifying MBS will be protected from all default risk by a 
combination of private capital and government guarantee. The government guarantee 
component is considered essential. The various plans differ primarily in the split between 
private capital and government guarantee; 
3) Risk-based insurance premia will be paid to the private capital and the government as 
compensation for the risks they bear. 
For simplicity, we refer to this structure as the “government insurance proposal.” 
A key feature of the insurance proposal relative to any plan that would recreate the GSEs 
is that the government would set the underwriting standards and be compensated for the 
risk it bears. 
The immediate question is whether the government can be effective and efficient 
in carrying out such a mortgage insurance program. Evidence is available from a variety  
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of existing government insurance programs. Perhaps the most positive evidence is the 
FHA program itself. As noted earlier, this program has existed since 1934, sets its 
premiums on an actuarial basis, and has never required a government subsidy or bailout 
for its self-supporting programs. Most interestingly, as documented in Jaffee and Quigley 
(2010), the FHA effectively sat out the subprime boom, allowing its overall market share 
to fall from a peak share of twenty-five percent in 1970 to under two percent by 2006. 
Even more dramatically, its market share of loans to minority borrowers, which had been 
close to fifty percent of this market as recently as 2000, fell to well below ten percent by 
2006. In effect, the FHA took no action to deter its traditional clients from switching to 
private market lenders and the GSEs as the source of their mortgage loans. While this 
inaction could not protect the FHA from the rising loss rate that is now affecting most 
segments of the U.S. mortgage market, it has certainly minimized the dollar amount of 
the losses that the FHA could still potentially impose on U.S. taxpayers. 
The FHA thus provides a model, or even a precise mechanism, for a broad 
government guarantee program, possibly covering the same market share—at times fifty 
percent of the overall market—that was traditionally served by the GSEs. Indeed, 
operating within its traditional programs, the FHA market share of total mortgage 
originations has already jumped dramatically from under two percent in 2006 to over 
twenty percent in 2010. The issue is whether the FHA mechanism, which has worked 
well serving a well-defined set of lower-income clients, can scale efficiently to serve 
what could be as much as three quarters of the entire U.S. mortgage market (summing a 
50 percent GSE share with a traditional 25 percent FHA share). The major concern is 
whether the FHA -- or any comparable government insurance plan -- can resist the  
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political pressures to reduce its underwriting standards and to subsidize its risk-based 
insurance premiums. The evidence here is not encouraging. 
An interesting and comparable case is the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP). The NFIP was created in 1968, following a series of disastrous mid-western 
floods that caused a large part of the private insurance industry to stop offering flood 
coverage. The NFIP legislation required premiums to be set on an actuarial basis, 
including risk-based premiums, to discourage the construction of new homes in flood 
zones. This noble goal floundered, however, when the owners of existing properties in 
dangerous flood plains successfully lobbied to obtain special “grandfathered” premium 
reductions. This all become evident when there were insufficient reserves to pay the 
losses created by Hurricane Katrina, thus requiring taxpayer bailout of the NFIP on the 
order of $22 billion. Further discussion of the NFIP see Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther 
(2011) and of failed government insurance programs in general see Jaffee and Russell 
(2006). 
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) provides an alternative approach to 
government insurance and may provide a useful structure for a government mortgage 
insurance program. TRIA was first passed by Congress in 2002, following the terrorism 
attack of September 2001. The issue was that, as a result of their World Trade Center 
losses, virtually all property insurers were refusing to renew policies on large commercial 
buildings unless there was a substantial government reinsurance program to cap their 
potential losses. TRIA accomplished this goal with a structure in which the government 
provides the insurers protection against possible catastrophic losses while placing the 
insurers in the first-loss position with a series of deductibles and coinsurance  
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requirements. Roughly speaking, TRIA 2002 required the industry itself to cover most of 
the losses that would have resulted from another event comparable to the sabotage of 
2011, but provided quite complete government protection against any losses above that 
level. TRIA has now been renewed two times, and both times the deductible and 
coinsurance requirements have been raised, so a taxpayer loss would now occur only with 
truly extreme events.
21 
The specific proposals offered by Acharya, Richardson, Van Nieuwerburgh, and 
White (2011) and Hancock and Passmore (2010) both reference “catastrophe insurance” 
as the coverage to be provided under their plans. A particular concern, however, is that 
MBS investors might not consider government catastrophe coverage to be a sufficient 
inducement for them to take the first-loss positions on portfolios of U.S. mortgages. For 
example, while the property insurers may have been most concerned with the last twenty 
percent of the tail risk from terrorist attacks, investors in residential mortgage pools may 
be primarily concerned with the first twenty percent of the risk distribution. In that case, 
for a government mortgage insurance program to be effective, it may have to mimic the 
NFIP more than TRIA. In other words, even if the starting point were the principle of a 
backstop to catastrophe, the political process may create a plan that covers high-risk 
mortgages at subsidized rates, i.e., GSEs with a different “cover.” 
This appears to be the conundrum for creating a feasible program for government 
insurance of U.S. mortgages. While a true catastrophe government insurance plan appears 
feasible, investors and other market participants will, of course, have incentives to push 
as much of the first-loss risk as possible under the government’s coverage. If the political 
                                                 
21 On the other hand, the government’s TRIA coverage is provided without charge.  
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process can stand firm on the issue, then it is quite possible that private incentives will 
create an efficient market for U.S. mortgages. After all, it is hard to believe that only the 
countries of Western Europe have the ability to create effective mortgage markets while 
maintaining a low level of government intervention. 
C. The Role of GSE Mortgage Market Activity under the Conservatorship 
In concluding, it is relevant to comment on the role of GSE mortgage market 
activity since the two firms were placed under a government Conservatorship in 
September 2008. Relevant data on the home mortgage acquisitions of the GSEs and for 
the total home mortgage market are shown in Table 9 for 2009 and 2010. The raw 
numbers suggest a significant GSE and overall government role. For 2009 and 2010, 
annual GSE mortgage acquisitions as a percentage of total home originations was 63 
percent. FHA and VA activity averaged 24 percent of total home originations over the 
same period, so government programs participated in 87 percent of all mortgage 
originations for 2009 and 2010. 
The high GSE market share under the Conservatorship, however, can be 
misleading. First, 80 percent of all GSE mortgage acquisitions were refinanced loans, so 
only 20 percent of the GSE activity represented loans for home purchase. The GSE 
refinancing activity includes the refinancings that occurred under the Home Affordable 
Refinance Program (HARP). In comparison, for the overall mortgage market, home 
refinancings represented 68 percent of total mortgage originations, leaving 32% of the 
originations for home purchase activity. The conclusion is that while the GSEs dominated 
U.S. mortgage market activity in 2009 and 2010, most of this activity was simply the 
refinancing of mortgage loans that had already been guaranteed by the GSEs. To be clear,  
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refinancing activities are certainly beneficial to the borrowers, and generally so for the 
GSEs as well (since they reduce the likelihood of default on these loans for which the 
GSEs are already at risk). On the other hand, refinancing is a zero-sum game, since the 
investors who are holding the higher rate mortgages will have to reinvest their money at 
the now lower market rates. Indeed, the Federal Reserve, U.S. Treasury, and GSEs are 
major holders of these GSE mortgage securities, so the HARP program is far from cost-
free for the government itself.
22 
The GSEs also participate in the Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP), along with servicers for non-GSE home mortgages. As of September 2011, the 
GSE share of total HAMP modifications was 52 percent, only slightly above the GSE 
share of all outstanding home mortgages. This suggests that the participation rate in 
HAMP modifications was about the same for GSE and non-GSE mortgages. Perhaps 
more importantly, the HAMP program is widely considered to be a disappointment: as of 
September 2011, just over 800 thousand loans had been modified, compared to the earlier 
hopes of 3 to 4 million loans. 
The overall conclusion is that the primary mortgage market result of maintaining 
the GSEs under the government Conservatorship through 2011 appears to have been their 
role as a catalyst for the refinancing of their existing mortgages. In terms of funding for 
home purchase loans, private market lenders have actually been more active than the 
GSEs, even without the benefit of a government guarantee. 
                                                 
22 See Remy, Lucas, and Moore (2011) for a Congressional Budget Office analysis of the most recent 
changes in the  HARP program.  
48 
Data Appendix 
The Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (FoF) tables provide the longest (1945 to the 
present), consistent, quantification of home mortgages outstanding.
23 The FoF data 
include a separation between mortgages held directly in investor portfolios and those held 
within mortgage pools for mortgage-backed securitization (MBS), including some detail 
on the holders of each category. For Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 and 2, we apply the 
FoF data for the aggregate outstanding home mortgages and the separation between loans 
held in portfolios and in mortgage pools.  
For the separation of MBS outstanding among three issuer classes, the FoF data 
directly quantify MBS issued by private label securitizers (PLS, meaning MBS without 
government or GSE backing), and the sum of GNMA and GSE data. We obtain direct 
measures of GNMA MBS outstanding from the Historical Statistics of the United States 
(with the latest 2010 data from Inside ABS), and compute the GSE MBS outstanding as 
the residual, (which closely aligns with direct measures of GSE MBS from the 
company’s own reports).
24  
For the separation of whole mortgages and MBS among three holder classes, the 
FoF data directly quantify the whole home mortgages and the securitized pools held by 
depository institutions (commercial banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks, 
and credit unions). Whole mortgages and MBS held in the retained portfolios of the GSE 
are obtained from the 2010 report to Congress their regulator, Federal Housing Finance 
                                                 
23 The FoF data are available at http://www.feder alreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm . Home 
mortgages are defined as mortgages on 1 to 4 family homes, thus excluding multifamily, farm, and 
commercial mortgages. 
24 Both GSEs adopted an accounting change—integrating their outstanding MBS commitments onto their 
balance sheet—that makes their 2010 data inconsistent with all previous data. Our method avoids this 
accounting change, allowing us to maintain consistency throughout the sample period.  
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Agency (2010), with the 2010 data obtained from the companies’ Monthly Volume 
reports. Whole mortgages and MBS held by other investors are computed as the residual 
category.  
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Table 1 
Outstanding Whole Home Mortgages 
  Year 
  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
A. Billions  of  Dollars            
Portfolio  Holdings  $45 $141 $289 $851 $1,496  $2,297  $3,918 
Depository  Institutions 27  95 207 642 1,066  1,669  2,959 
Market Investors  17  40  65  146  316  441  478 
GSE Portfolios  1  6  17  62  114  187  481 
           
Mortgage Pools  0  0  3  107  1,111  2,811  6,614 
GSE Pools  0  0  0  13  652  1814  4,311 
GNMA Pools  0  0  3  94  404  612  1,038 
PLS Pools  0  0  0  0  55  386  1,265 
           
Total  $45 $141 $292 $958 $2,606  $5,108 $10,531 
           
B. Percentage  of  Total           
Portfolio Holdings  100%  100%  99%  89%  57%  45%  37%
Depository Institutions  60  67  71  67  41  33  28 
Market Investors   38  29  22  15  12  5  5 
GSE Portfolios  2  4  6  7  4  8  5 
           
Mortgage Pools  0  0  1  11  43  55  63 
GSE Pools  0  0  0  1  25  36  41 
GNMA Pools  0  0  1  10  15  12  10 
PLS Pools  0  0  0  0  2  8  12 
           
Total 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
           
C.  GSE Whole Loans Held 
+ MBS Issued 
3% 4% 6% 8%  29%  44%  46%
 
Source: see data appendix  
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Table 2 
Holdings of Whole Home Mortgages and MBS by Investor Class 
Billions of Dollars  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
Depository  Institutions           
Whole  Mortgages  $27  $95 $207 $642 $1,066 $1,669  $2,959 
MBS  0 0 0  41  385  604  1,368 
Total  27  95 207 683 1,450 2,272  4,326 
           
Market  Investors           
Whole  Mortgages  17 40 65  146  316  195  478 
MBS  0 0 3  66  714  1,446  4,444 
Total  17 40 68  212  1,030  1,641 4,923 
           
G S E s            
Whole Mortgages  1  6  17  62  114  433  481 
MBS  0 0 0 0  12  762 802 
Total 1  6  17  62  126  1,195  1,283 
           
Total  Home  Mortgages  $45 $141 $292 $958 $2,606 $5,107 $10,531 
 
 
Source: see data appendix  
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Table 3 
Conforming Mortgage Originations by Origination Year, 
Characteristics, and GSE Market Share 
A. Conforming  Originations,
25 Billions of Dollars  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
(1)  Loan to Value Ratio > 90%   108  121  154  130  112  115  169 
(2)  FICO Score < 620  94  126  164  194  211  162  92 
(3)  ARMs  83 200 332 516 579 447 165 
(4)  High Risk Originations
26  241 367 536 664 719 597 374 
(5)  Total  Conforming  Originations  1,064 1,451 2,074 1,331 1,454 1,307 1,117 
(6)  High Risk as % of Total Conforming  22.6%  25.3%  25.9%  49.9%  49.5%  45.7%  33.5% 
         
B.  GSE Share of Risk Attributes         
(7)  Loan to Value Ratio > 90%  92.2%  86.4%  76.0%  59.6%  58.4%  66.8%  93.1% 
(8)  FICO Score < 620  63.9  56.7  47.0  25.1  22.4  32.5  76.8 
(9)  ARMs  50.7 60.5 56.5 36.8 29.0 33.1 62.6 
(10)  High Risk Originations  77.2 72.7 65.3 43.5 36.3 42.5 79.9 
(11)  GSE Share Total Conforming Loans  93.7  91.6  88.7  67.5  61.9  67.1  90.7 
         
C.  Relative Intensity (1.0 = “Market Portfolio”)
27         
(12)  Loan to Value Ratio > 90%  0.98  0.94  0.86  0.88  0.94  1.00  1.03 
(13)  FICO Score < 620  0.68  0.62  0.53  0.37  0.36  0.49  0.85 
(14)  ARMs  0.54 0.66 0.64 0.55 0.47 0.49 0.69 
(15)  High Risk Originations  0.82 0.79 0.74 0.64 0.59 0.63 0.88 
(16)  GSE Total Conforming Loans  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Sources: all data are from Federal Housing Administration (2010a). 
                                                 
25 Conforming mortgage originations exclude originations retained in lender portfolios. 
26 Line (4) = (1) + (2) + (3) - adjustment for mortgages with multiple factors. 
27 Relative intensity = GSE Share of Risk Attribute/GSE Share Conforming Loans (row 11).  
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Table 4 
Conventional Single-Family Business Volume by Attribute and Year* 
Fannie Mae  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
LTV  >  90%  11%  8%  7% 10%  9% 10% 16% 
FICO  <  620 6 6 4 6 5 6 6 
ARMs  6  9 10 22%  21 17 10 
Interest  Only  NA  1 1 5  10  15  16 
Condo/Coop  NA  7 7 9  10  11  11 
Investor  4 5 6 4 5 6 5 
         
Freddie Mac         
LTV  >  90%  11% 7% 5% 7% 6% 6%  11% 
FICO  <  620 4 3 3 4 4 5 6 
ARMs  8 12 13 17 18 16 20 
Interest  Only NA NA NA  3  1  0  0 
Condo/Coop NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Investor  2 2 4 4 4 5 6 
Source: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Annual Reports. 
 
* Loans may have more than one of the characteristics.  
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Table 5 
The Performance of European Mortgage Markets in Comparison with the US
* 
Statistical Measures Computed with annual data by country for the years 1998 to 2010 
  Rate of 
Owner 
Occupancy 
Latest Year 
Coefficient of 
Covariation 
of Housing 
Starts 
1 
Standard 
Deviation of 
House Price 
Inflation 
Mortgage 
Adjustable 
Rate Average 
Level 
Mortgage 
Interest Rate 
Average 
Spread 
2 
Mortgage To 
GDP Ratio 
2010 
Western Europe        
Austria  57.5%  7.2%  2.7%  4.83%  1.79%  28.0% 
Belgium  78.0%  15.2%  7.4%  5.61%  2.58%  46.3% 
Denmark  53.6%  56.1%  8.5%  5.80%  2.58%  101.4% 
Finland  59.0%  11.9%  3.8%  4.13%  1.09%  42.3% 
France  57.8%  17.4%  6.2%  4.83%  1.80%  41.2% 
Germany  43.2%  29.0%  1.7%  5.07%  2.05%  46.5% 
Ireland  74.5%  99.2%  14.2%  4.32%  1.15%  87.1% 
Italy  80.0%  25.7%  3.4%  4.70%  1.56%  22.7% 
Luxembourg  70.4%  17.9%  4.7%  4.08%  1.05%  44.7% 
Netherlands  55.5%  14.5%  6.5%  5.08%  2.06%  107.1% 
Norway  85.0%  24.6%  5.0%  6.11%  1.44%  70.3% 
Portugal  74.6%  35.5%  2.9%  4.43%  1.35%  66.3% 
Spain  85.0%  93.0%  8.1%  4.16%  1.08%  64.0% 
Sweden  66.0%  45.5%  2.9%  3.75%  0.91%  81.8% 
United Kingdom  66.4%  25.0%  6.8%  5.12%  0.93%  85.0% 
        
EU Average  67.1% 34.5%  5.6%  4.80% 1.56%  62.3% 
        
US  66.9% 45.5%  7.3%  5.07% 2.26%  76.5% 
        
US Rank  8
th of 16  3rd of 16  5
th of 16  6
th of 16  3
rd of 16  6
th of 16 
 
                                                 
* Unless noted otherwise, the data are all from European Mortgage Federation (2009), an annual fact book that contains comprehensive mortgage and housing 
market data for the years 1998 to 2009 for 15 Western European countries and the United States. 1) Computations based on housing starts where available; all 
other countries use housing permits. 2) The mortgage interest rate spread is based on the 3-month Treasury Bill rate from the OECD Economic Outlook Date 
Base. Table 6 
Effects of GSE Goals on Housing Market Outcomes 
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Author 
Time 
Period Data 
Effect of Outcomes on 
GSE Goals 
Effect on Other 
Housing Outcomes  Remarks 
Wyly and 
Holloway 
(2002) 
1997-
2000 
Loan applications from 
HMDA 
  1% increase in subprime market 
share leads to a rise in 
nondisclosure (of race-
ethnicity) of 0.6% in the 
refinance market. Nonreporting 
rates are the highest in the 
subprime refinance markets, 
especially in inner city and low-
income areas. 
An increasing number of 
HMDA loan applications 
contain no information on the 
applicant’s race or ethnic 
identity. They also conducted a 
case study in Atlanta on the 
disappearance of race data. 
Ambrose 
and 
Thibodeau 
(2004) 
1995-
1999 
Dollar volume of 
purchase and refinance 
loans from HMDA, by 
MSA. 
Lenders increased the 
supply of mortgage 
credit in areas with 
higher proportions of 
underserved borrowers. 
Increases in GSE 
purchases of seasoned 
loans in an MSA lead 
to increases in total 
mortgage origination 
volume in the MSA. 
Volume of mortgages increased 
steadily between 1995 and 
1998, declining slightly in 1999. 
27% increase in volume of 
purchase mortgages by 1998, 
and mortgage refinances 
increased 211%. In 1999, 
mortgage refinance volume fell 
42% and purchase mortgage 
volume increased another 12%. 
1998 appears to be an unusual 
year and significance of the 
coefficients might arise from 
the sudden increase in 
mortgage purchase and 
refinance volume that year. 
Friedman 
and Squires 
(2005) 
2000  Loan application and 
purchase data from 
2000 HMDA, by 
MSA. Restricted to 
conventional loans 
originated to purchase 
1-4 family homes. 
  Blacks and Latinos are more 
likely to purchase homes in 
predominantly white 
neighborhoods in MSAs where 
more loans are made by CRA 
lenders. 
Based on census tract racial 
composition grouped into three 
descriptive categories: 
predominantly white, racially 
integrated; and predominantly 
minority. Table 6 
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Author 
Time 
Period Data 
Effect of Outcomes on 
GSE Goals 
Effect on Other 
Housing Outcomes  Remarks 
Avery, 
Bostic, and 
Canner 
(2005) 
2000  Total lending and 
lending experiences of 
institutions from the 
Survey of the 
Performance and 
Profitability of CRA-
Related Lending, 2000 
  Almost 60% of institutions 
explicitly responded to CRA 
obligations; half engaged in 
community development 
activities, and 30% had home 
mortgage purchases and 
refinance activities. 
Survey conducted by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve to measure responses 
of lending institutions to CRA. 
Bostic and 
Gabriel 
(2006) 
1994, 
1999 
GSE loan purchase 
volume in California 
census tracts analyzed 
by MSA. 
San Francisco MSA 
had a greater increase 
in homeownership 
rates in designated 
tracts. No significant 
differences observed 
elsewhere in 
California. 
No significant differences in 
housing market performance 
between GSE-targeted census 
tracts and those just above and 
below the GSE target. 
Model relates breaks from 80-
90% and 90-100% of median 
income census tract effects to 
changes in housing market 
outcomes 
An and 
Bostic 
(2006) 
1995-
2001 
Shares of HMDA loans 
sold on secondary 
market, by purchasing 
institution and census 
tract. 
1% increase in GSE 
market share leads to 
0.27% reduction in sub 
market share. 
Increases in GSE purchase 
activity are associated with 
declines in subprime mortgage 
activity, especially in 
neighborhoods with high 
minority populations. 
Effect of FHA growth on sub 
market share is smaller. 
An, Bostic, 
Deng, 
Gabriel, 
Green, and 
Tracy 
(2007) 
1995-
2000 
Annual GSE home 
loan-purchase, from 
HMDA, by census 
tract. 
Increases in the percent 
of GSE purchases by 
tract are associated 
with declines in 
neighborhood vacancy 
rates and increases in 
median home values. 
Significant deterioration in the 
credit quality of FHA-insured 
borrowers after 1996; GSEs 
may have given FHA borrowers 
in targeted tracts better access 
to less expensive, conventional, 
conforming loans 
Possible endogenity: GSE 
percent of purchase may be 
function of other housing 
market trends; GSE loan-
purchase may be a function of 
housing market trends; GSEs 
might simply shift their 
purchase activity among 
neighborhoods. Table 6 
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Author 
Time 
Period Data 
Effect of Outcomes on 
GSE Goals 
Effect on Other 
Housing Outcomes  Remarks 
Laderman 
and Reid 
(2008) 
2004-
2006 
Loan application and 
origination information 
from HMDA, and loan 
performance data from 
Applied Analytics 
(LPS). Analysis is 
restricted to 
conventional, first-lien, 
owner-occupied loans 
originated in MSAs in 
California. 
  Loans made by a CRA lender 
within its assessment area in 
low-income neighborhoods 
were less likely (odds ratio .73) 
to be foreclosed than loans 
made by IMCs in the same 
neighborhoods. In moderate-
income neighborhoods, CRA 
lenders were 1.7 times less 
likely to be foreclosed. 
Analyzed CRA mortgage 
lending activities to measure 
effect on current crisis, but did 
not examine the impact that 
CRA investment or service 
components may have had on 
the current financial crisis. 
An and 
Bostic 
(2008) 
1996 – 
2002 
HMDA loan level 
application and 
origination 
information, matched 
to census tracts. 
Analysis is restricted to 
owner-occupied home 
purchase loans. 
GSE market shares are 
lower in central city 
tracts and in tracts with 
high minority 
populations and high 
vacancy rates. GSE 
market shares are 
higher in more affluent 
census tracts (with 
higher home values 
and/or higher 
incomes). 
Negative and significant 
correlation between GSE and 
FHA market share, by census 
tract. 
FHA and GSE loan purchases 
represent a small share of the 
market of loans. Other factors 
(like subprime mortgages) 
could dominate the relationship 
the authors found. The first 
stage regression is problematic; 
it showed no relationship 
between targeted census tracts 
and GSE market shares. 
An and 
Bostic 
(2009) 
1995-
2001 
Shares of HMDA loans 
sold on secondary 
market, by purchasing 
institution and census 
tract. 
Tracts with fewer total 
loans have less GSE 
penetration. 
Negative relationship between 
annual GSE purchase growth 
and annual growth in subprime 
loan originations. A 1 
percentage point increase in 
GSE share is associated with a 
0.45 percentage point decline in 
subprime market share. 
GSEs do not purchase 
subprime loans; this study is 
based on TSLS regression. Table 6 
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Author 
Time 
Period Data 
Effect of Outcomes on 
GSE Goals 
Effect on Other 
Housing Outcomes  Remarks 
Bhutta 
(2009) 
1997-
2004 
Loan amounts, 
originations, and loans 
sold on secondary 
market, by purchasing 
institution and census 
tract, from HMDA. 
Analysis is restricted to 
census tracts in MSAs. 
Goals increased GSE 
purchasing activity by 
3-4% in targeted tracts 
and increased GSE-
eligible originations by 
2-3% on average. 
No evidence that UAG-induced 
increases in GSE credit supply 
crowded out FHA and subprime 
lending. 
Regression discontinuity 
design. In contrast to the An 
and Bostic 2008 paper, Bhutta 
estimates the impact of the 
GSE Act separately on the 
number of GSE purchases, the 
total number of GSE-eligible 
originations, and the number of 
GSE-ineligible loans in 
targeted tracts. 
Bhutta 
(2010a) 
1994-
2002, 
1998-
2005 
Loan information by 
lender type, application 
status, loan purpose, 
secondary purchaser (if 
any) from HMDA, by 
census tract of the 
property and borrower 
income. 
On lending, CRA had 
little impact, even 
during the 2000s when 
lending to lower 
income areas soared. 
Small increase in 
nonbank lending in 
CRA-targeted 
neighborhoods of large 
MSAs, particularly in 
areas with historically 
low home sales. 
Increased bank lending does not 
crowd out lending by mortgage 
bank subsidiaries and 
independent mortgage 
companies. 
Regression discontinuity 
design. Limitation of RD 
design is that it only measures 
the CRA’s impact at the cutoff 
(80 percent of median income), 
so if there were a larger impact 
for borrowers and 
neighborhoods further below 
the cutoff, the RD would 
understate the CRA’s true 
impact. Table 6 
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Author 
Time 
Period Data 
Effect of Outcomes on 
GSE Goals 
Effect on Other 
Housing Outcomes  Remarks 
Bhutta 
(2010b) 
1997-
2002 
Mortgage originations 
and applications from 
HMDA, by census 
tracts in MSAs. 
Small UAG effect on 
GSE purchases and 
mortgage originations. 
GSEs purchase about 
3.4% fewer loans in 
tracts below the 
eligibility cutoff. 
No crowd out of FHA and 
subprime lending. 
Regression discontinuity 
design. Analysis might 
understate UAG’s effect 
because RD can only identify 
the goal’s impact for tracts near 
the eligibility thresholds. 
Bhutta notes that the UAG 
mostly affects relatively stable 
tracts, indicating that GSEs 
respond where it is least costly. 
Gabriel and 
Rosenthal 
(2010) 
1994-
2008 
Loan purchases and 
originations from 
HMDA, by census 
tracts located within 
MSAs. Census tracts 
were adjusted to match 
the 2000 census. 
The disappearance of 
GSE crowd out, with 
the 2007 financial 
crisis, suggests loans 
purchased by GSEs 
added substantively to 
the flow of mortgage 
credit. 
From 1994-2003, GSE crowd 
out of private secondary market 
purchases was small. From 
2004-2006, private loan 
purchases expanded and GSE 
crowd out estimates jumped to 
50%. After 2007, GSE crowd 
out was small again. 
Addressed GSE purchase 
endogeneity of instrumenting 
for applications using lagged 
tract homeownership rates. 
Increased local secondary 
market activity may result in 
some easing in local 
underwriting standards, 
causing local applications to 
increase. Thus OLS estimates 
would be biased upwards. With 
or without IVs, the trends were 
similar. Table 6 
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Author 
Time 
Period Data 
Effect of Outcomes on 
GSE Goals 
Effect on Other 
Housing Outcomes  Remarks 
Avery and 
Brevoort 
(20110) 
2001, 
2004-
2006 
Loan origination and 
purchases from 
HMDA, by census 
tract, with 3 outcome 
variables: 1) 
Percentage of 
mortgage borrowers 
who were 90 or more 
days past due on at 
least 1 mortgage 
obligation, from 
Equifax. 2) Percentage 
of first-lien mortgage 
loans originated in a 
tract during 2004-2006 
with estimated front-
end debt-to-income 
ratios exceeding 30 
percent, as a proxy for 
high-risk or subprime 
lending activity from 
HMDA. 3) House price 
changes between 2001-
2006 and 2006-2008 
calculated from 
HMDA. 
No statistically 
significant relationship 
between loan sales to 
the GSEs and 
delinquency. 
Found no evidence that CRA 
and GSE goals contributed to 
house price increases during the 
2001-2006 buildup. CRA 
targeted census tracts show 
fewer loan delinquencies in 
2008. 
Regression discontinuity 
design. Believes loan quality 
and performance is important 
to measure for GSE and CRA 
goal success, in addition to 
loan volume. Loan 
performance data are missing; 
they measured loan quality by 
post-buildup delinquency rates 
and risk characteristics. Also, 
aggregation of analysis obscure 
the fact that subprime boom 
took on different forms in 
different geographic regions. Table 6 
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Author 
Time 
Period Data 
Effect of Outcomes on 
GSE Goals 
Effect on Other 
Housing Outcomes  Remarks 
Moulton 
(2010) 
1996-
1997, 
2006-
2007 
Loan originations and 
purchases, 
foreclosures, 
vacancies, high-priced 
loans, and other 
housing outcomes from 
HUD and HMDA by 
census tract and also 
by loan applicant. 
Special Affordable 
Goal increased GSE 
purchases from very 
low-income borrowers 
by four percent but had 
no effect on mortgage 
lending. 
No evidence that 
LMIG or UAG altered 
GSE purchase or 
mortgage lending 
decisions. 
No relationship between GSE 
Act’s affordable housing goals 
and increased foreclosures, 
vacancies, or other housing 
outcomes. 
Regression discontinuity 
design. Diverges from Bhutta 
2009 paper in a few ways. 
Bhutta uses data aggregated to 
the census tract-level, while 
Moulton uses variation in loan 
applicant-level data to examine 
individual loan outcomes, 
allowing Moulton to examine 
the individual-level goals 
outlined in the LMIG and 
SAG. 
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Table 7 
Estimates of GSE Funding Advantage 
Author Data  Comparison 
Spread 
in Basis 
Points 
US Treasury (1996)  Bloomberg  Agency vs   
   A  Financials  53-55 
Ambrose and Varga   Fixed Income   Fannie Mae vs   
(1996)  Research Program  AA Financials  37-46 
   AA  Corporate  38-39 
   A  Financials  56-72 
   A  Corporate  55-65 
Freddie Mac  Lehman  Freddie vs   
(1996)  Relative Value  AA & A  39 
   AAA  23 
Toevs Lehman  Fannie  Mae  vs   
(2000) Bond  Indexes  AA-Indexes  37 
Pearce and Miller  Bloomberg  Agency vs   
(2001)   AA  Financials  37 
Ambrose and Varga  Fixed Investment   Freddie and Fannie vs   
(2002)  Securities Database  AA Banks  25-29 
Nothaft, et al  Fixed Investment   Freddie and Fannie vs   
(2002)  Securities Database  AA Debentures  30 
   A  Debentures  45 
   AA  MTNs  27 
   A  MTNs  34 
Passmore, et al  Bloomberg Lehman  Freddie and Fannie vs   
(2005)    AAA & AA Financials:   
   68  Firms  41 
   44  Firms  38 
   15  Firms  38 
Source: Nothaft, et al (2002), Ambrose and Varga (2002), Passmore, et al, (2005). See Quigley (2006) for 
additional details.  
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Table 8 
Estimates of Reduction in Mortgage 
Interest Rates Attributable 
to GSEs 
Author Time  Period  Region 
Reduction in 
Basis Points 
Hendershott and Shilling (1989)  1986 California 24-39 
ICF (1990)  1987 California 
7 States
26 
23 
Cotterman and Pearce (1996)  1989-1993 California 
11 States
25-50 
24-60 
Pearce (2000)  1992-1999 California 
11 States
27 
24 
Ambrose, Buttimer and Thibodeau 
(2001) 
1990-1999 Dallas 16-24 
Naranjo and Toevs (2002)  1986-1998 US 8-43 
Passmore, Sparks and Ingpen 
(2002) 
1992-1999 California 18-23 
CBO (2001)  1995-2000 US 23 
McKenzie (2002)  1986-2000 
1996-2000
US 
US
22 
19 
Ambrose, La Cour-Little and 
Saunders (2004) 
1995-1997 US 6 
Woodward 1996-2001 (2004b)  1996-2001 US 35-52 
Passmore, Sherlan and Burgess 
(2005) 
1997-2003 US 15-18 
Blinder, Flannery and Lockhart 
(2006) 
1997-2003 US 23-29 
Source: McKenzie (2002); Ambrose (2004), Blinder, et al, (2006); Passmore, et al, (2005); Woodward (2004b). See 
Quigley (2006) for details.  
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Table 9 
Home Mortgage Activity, 2009 and 2010 
Home Mortgage Activity in $ Billions  2009  2010  Total 
Fannie Mae Mortgage Acquisitions  700  608  1,308 
Freddie Mac Mortgage Acquisitions  475  386  861 
Total GSE Mortgage Acquisitions  1,175  994  2,169 
Total Home Mortgage Originations  1,840  1,630  3,470 
     
Share of Total Home Mortgage Originations     
GSE Share of Total Originations  64%  61%  63% 
FHA and VA Share of Total Originations  24% 23% 24% 
GSE, FHA, and VA Share of Total Originations  88%  84%  87% 
     
Total GSE Refinanced Acquisitions  80%  79%  80% 
Total Home Mortgage Refinancings  69%  67%  68% 
Sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency 2010 Annual Report to Congress, Inside Mortgage Finance (for total and 
refinanced mortgage originations), and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 2010 Annual Reports (for GSE refinancings).  
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Figure 1 
Share of Whole Mortgages Held Directly, by Holder Class 
(Source: See Data Appendix) 
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Figure 2 
Share of MBS Outstanding, by Holder Class 
(Source: See Data Appendix) 
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Figure 3 
Share of Whole Mortgages and MBS, by Holder Class 
(Source: See Data Appendix) 
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Figure 4 
Share of MBS Outstanding, by MBS Issuer 
(Source: See Data Appendix) 
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Figure 5 
GSE "Low-Moderate Income" Housing Goal, 1993-2008 
(Percent of New Loans to Households With Incomes Below Area Median Income) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. "Overview of the GSEs' 
Housing Goal Performance, 1993-2001", "Overview of the GSEs' Housing Goal Performance, 2000-2007,”  
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Figure 6 
GSE "Underserved Area" Housing Goal, 1993-2008 
(Percent of New Loans Credited Towards Goal) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. "Overview of the GSEs' 
Housing Goal Performance, 1993-2001", "Overview of the GSEs' Housing Goal Performance, 2000-2007."  
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Figure 7 
GSE "Special Affordable" Housing Goal, 1993-2008 
(Percent of New Loans Credited Towards Goal) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. "Overview of the GSEs' 
Housing Goal Performance, 1993-2001", "Overview of the GSEs' Housing Goal Performance, 2000-2007."  
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Figure 8 
GSE “Low-Moderate Income” Housing Goals and Market Shares, 1993-2008 
 
Source: Weicher, John C. "The Affordable Housing Goals, Homeownership and Risk: Some Lessons from Past Efforts to Regulate the 
GSEs", Conference on "The Past, Present, and Future of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises", Federal Bank of St. Louis.  
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Figure 9 
GSE “Underserved Area” Housing Goals and Market Shares, 1993-2008 
 
Source: Weicher, John C. "The Affordable Housing Goals, Homeownership and Risk: Some Lessons from Past Efforts to Regulate the 
GSEs", Conference on "The Past, Present, and Future of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises", Federal Bank of St. Louis.  
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Figure 10 
GSE “Special Affordable” Housing Goals and Market Shares, 1993-2008 
 
Source: Weicher, John C. "The Affordable Housing Goals, Homeownership and Risk: Some Lessons from Past Efforts to Regulate the 
GSEs", Conference on "The Past, Present, and Future of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises", Federal Bank of St. Louis.  
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Figure 11 
GSE “Special Affordable Multifamily” Housing Goals and GSE Purchases, 1993-2008* 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. "Overview of the GSEs' 
Housing Goal Performance, 1993-2001", "Overview of the GSEs' Housing Goal Performance, 2000-2007." 
* New loans to households residing in census tracts with incomes below the area median, in billions of dollars.  
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Figure 12 
GSE Purchases of Multifamily Mortgages, 1985-2009 
(as a percent of all mortgages) 
 
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency, Report to Congress 2009, Historical Data Tables; pp 125, 142.  
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Figure 13 
Commercial and Multifamily Mortgage Bankers’ Originations 
2004-2009 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, September 2009 Appendix Table A1 
Homeownership and Social Outcomes 
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Author 
Time 
Period  Data  Housing Outcome Observed  Comments 
Rossi and 
Weber 
(1996) 
1988- 
1995 
General Social Survey 
and the National Survey 
of Families and 
Households, 
supplemented by data 
from the American 
National Election 
Studies, by individual 
Homeowners have slightly higher self-esteem, 
life satisfaction, and are more involved with 
community groups. 
The effects of homeownership are not 
large and sometimes inconsistent. It is 
difficult to determine endogeneity. 
Oswald 
(1996) 
1960s - 
1990 
Statistical Abstract and 
Eurostat, by country 
Homeownership reduces workers’ mobility, 
thus causing them to stay unemployed longer. A 
ten percent increase in homeownership is 
associated with approximately a two percent 
increase in unemployment. 
Small sample sizes makes the results 
unreliable. 
Green and 
White 
(1997) 
1980-
1987 
Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), the 
Public Use Microsample 
of the 1980 Census of 
Population and Housing 
(PUMS), and High 
School and Beyond 
(HSB), by child 
Adjusting for income and parental differences in 
the PSID data, children of owner-occupied 
homes have a predicted probability of 
completing high school of .91, compared to .82 
for renters. The differential falls as income 
rises. In the PUMS, homeowner children had a 
.9 probability of being in school, compared to 
.83 for children of renters at the same age. 
The HSB data comes from parents who 
completed high school. Probit models 
are used to account for selection bias 
due to differences between parents 
who own and rent. Also, using the 
lifetime earnings differential between a 
high school dropout and a high school 
graduate, the benefit of a government 
policy to encourage low income renters 
to own homes is estimated to be about 
$31,000. Appendix Table A1 
Homeownership and Social Outcomes (continued) 
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Author 
Time 
Period  Data  Housing Outcome Observed  Comments 
DiPasquale 
and Glaeser 
(1999) 
1972-
1994 
General Social Survey, 
German Socio-Economic 
Panel, by individual 
Controlling for age, race, sex, marital status, 
children, income, education, residential 
structure type, and city size, homeowners are 
roughly 10% more likely to know their US 
representative, 9% more likely to know the 
identity of their school board head, 15% more 
likely to vote in local elections, 6% more likely 
to work to solve local problems, than renters. 
Homeowners invest more in social capital and 
local amenities. Homeowners are better citizens.
Authors use the average 
homeownership rate of the individual’s 
income quartile as an instrument for 
homeownership. They could not 
measure the extent of the positive 
externalities. They also found 
homeowners are less likely to move 
than renters. The cost of immobility is 
not calculated. 
Aaronson 
(2000) 
1975- 
1993 
Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, children aged 
7 to 16 
For the base case, where the child is white, 
male, lives in a household with married parents, 
two siblings, average income, and the head of 
household is a high school graduate, the 
probability of graduating from high school for 
children who live in owner occupied housing is 
1.5% higher than renters. Latent family stability 
factors explain as least 20% of the 
homeownership effect. 
Response to the Green and White 
paper. Argues that a child’s school 
graduation does not depend on 
homeownership as much as it depends 
on the stability homeownership offers 
the child. 
Green and 
Hendershott 
(2001) 
1986-
1992 
Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics, by individual 
A ten-percentage point increase in 
homeownership increases unemployment by 
months. four percent increase 
Response to Oswald paper. There are 
seasonal effects of unemployment and 
how quickly unemployed individuals 
find work. For example, in 1988, heads 
of households who became 
unemployed were reemployed 
significantly quicker in December than 
in other months. Appendix Table A1 
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Author 
Time 
Period  Data  Housing Outcome Observed  Comments 
Boyle 
(2002) 
1983  Ontario Child Health 
Study, the National 
Longitudinal Study of 
Children and Youth, by 
child 
The correlation between home ownership and 
child problem behavior was -0.18. The 
correlation between neighborhood 
homeownership rates and the incidence of child 
problems was not significant. 
 The study controlled for 
socioeconomic differences between 
owners and renters, but not for other 
parental characteristics like the 
physical, mental, and social health of 
the parents, which might have also 
affected the association between home 
ownership and child problem behavior. 
Haurin, 
Parcel, and 
Haurin 
(2002) 
1988, 
1990, 
1992, 
1994 
National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, 
children aged five to 
eight 
The longer a parent owns a home, the greater 
the child’s cognition skills and the fewer the 
child’s behavior problems. The correlation 
between homeownership with “Behavior 
Problems Index” is -0.07. 
The explanatory variables included 
both contemporaneous home 
ownership and duration of home 
ownership. (Controlling also for the 
mother’s and father’s characteristics 
separately education, wage, and race, 
as well as socioeconomic variables, for 
community factors like neighborhood 
characteristics.) 
Conley and 
Gifford 
(2006) 
1981-
1994 
Luxembourg Income 
Study, Comparative 
Welfare States Data Set, 
by country 
Compared different countries and found that 
more widespread home ownership is positively 
associated with higher income inequality and 
negatively associated with welfare spending. A 
one percentage point increase in social 
insurance spending by the government results in 
0.75 percentage point decrease in 
homeownership. 
This study does not measure the causal 
directionality of homeownership, 
social insurance, and welfare. 
Munch, 
Rosholm, 
and Svarer 
(2007) 
1993-
2001 
Statistics Denmark 
administrative registers, 
by individual 
Homeowners have a 29% lower unemployment 
risk than renters. Homeowners have a wage 
premium 5.37% higher than renters and owners 
set higher reservation wages for jobs outside the 
local labor market relative to renters. 
Crude estimates. Appendix Table A1 
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Author 
Time 
Period  Data  Housing Outcome Observed  Comments 
Coulson and 
Li (2010) 
1989, 
1993 
American Housing 
Survey, by cluster 
Income increases with higher ownership rates, 
but the results are small and sometimes 
insignificant. The transition of a home from 
rental to ownership in a typical neighborhood 
creates $1000-3000 per year in positive 
externality value. 
Measured the units of observation by 
neighborhood cluster, which typically 
had 11 houses. 
 